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Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts 
 
This dissertation consists of three papers, two on current issues in transportation economics, the 
third analysing team production using sports data. What links the three papers is their empirical 
nature. Taken together, they do not form a unit within the same research field. The primary 
reason for this will become apparent below. In the following, I briefly outline the broader con-
text, main research questions, methods used, results, and contributions of each of the three pa-
pers.  
The two papers on current issues in transportation economics emerged from my employ-
ment at the Institute of Tourism and Mobility at the Lucerne University of Applied Sciences 
and Arts. Both papers add to discussions on the governance of public transport that are currently 
taking place in the industry and the associated research community.1 Originally, these discus-
sions arose after the second post-war period as the start of a lasting trend towards the liberali-
sation and deregulation of public service provision (Zatti, 2012). This trend is particularly evi-
dent in public transport, where competition for the market (competitive tendering) has become 
common practice in many countries. Ever since, politicians, the authorities, and researchers all 
around the world have tried to establish optimal regimes to regulate and govern public transport. 
In respect of subsidised public transport, the initial euphoria about the use of competitive ten-
dering has abated in recent years, despite some success stories (Veeneman & Smith, 2016). 
Practitioners and researchers are increasingly stressing the role of transaction costs and discuss-
ing the design of hybrid or mixed forms of governance. The main idea is to combine competitive 
and cooperative governance forms to exploit their advantages and avoid their disadvantages 
(Merkert et al., 2018; Preston & Walters, 2020). Both of my papers on transportation economics 
fit into these ongoing debates.2 
  
 
1 For many years, the Thredbo International Conference Series on Competition and Ownership in Land 
Passenger Transport has constituted a premier international forum dedicated to advancing the field of pub-
lic transport governance. I presented both my papers on transportation economics at this conference. 
2 Recently, Switzerland’s public transport has experienced several scandals related to excessive subsidies 
(e.g., the largest public bus operator Postbus hiding illegal profits, Ernst & Young, 2018). As a result, pub-
lic transport governance has increasingly attracted public attention, and the authorities have taken appropri-
ate measures (Federal Office of Transport FOT, 2020b). 
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The first paper, The impact of alternative governance forms of regional public rail 
transport on transaction costs. Case evidence for Germany and Switzerland (Appendix A. 1, 
pp. 11–42),3 identifies the dimensions and drivers of transaction costs in the governance of 
regional public rail transport. We compare two common but distinct governance forms. On the 
one hand, the cooperative governance form, as in Switzerland, is characterized by the absence 
of competitive elements. Incumbent transport operating companies (TOCs) provide public rail 
services on behalf of public transport authorities (PTAs) on the basis of directly awarded con-
tracts. On the other hand, in the competitive governance form, as in Germany, competition for 
the market (competitive tendering) is the principal feature.  
In studies about governance forms in public transport, transaction costs have often been 
mentioned as (potentially) substantial. It is therefore necessary to consider these costs when 
assessing different governance forms. However, an exhaustive and comprehensive examination 
of the dimensions and drivers of transaction costs in the governance of public transport is still 
missing. The central research question is therefore as follows: What dimensions and drivers of 
transaction costs emerge with different forms of public transport governance?  
Following the explorative nature of our research question, we apply qualitative methods 
based on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). More particularly, we use a multiple case 
study approach drawing on the contrasting cases of Switzerland’s and Germany’s respective 
forms of governance for regional public rail transport. We gather data from semi-structured 
interviews with industry representatives (TOCs, PTAs, consultants, and researchers). Interview 
transcripts and additional documents are analysed in multiple stages using qualitative content 
analysis.  
The main results are as follows. Besides the procedure for awarding contracts, transaction 
costs accrue in the provision of customer-friendly system services (e.g., timetable integration) 
and when establishing the institutional framework (also referred to as institutional transition 
costs). In addition, there is a dynamic dimension to the transaction costs, on which learning 
effects, emerging challenges, and efforts to advance public transport potentially have a strong 
influence. Overall, neither form of governance seems to be superior to the other in terms of the 
level of transaction costs. However, there are substantial differences in where and why such 
costs occur. In the cooperative governance form, the major driver of transaction costs is the 
necessity for PTAs to develop and implement various instruments, so-called competition sur-
 
3 A version of this paper has been published in Research in Transportation Economics. 
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rogates, to overcome information asymmetries regarding cost efficiency. Examples of such in-
struments are micromanagement of negotiations and contracts, tight monitoring of the TOCs’ 
costs, and benchmarking. Transaction costs tend to be reduced if there is a high level of trust 
among stakeholders. In the competitive governance form, on the other hand, transaction costs 
are mainly driven by the PTAs’ role as market makers. PTAs have to ensure that the market is 
attractive to potential bidders. This requires, e.g., the design of fair and efficient tendering pro-
cedures and limiting the TOCs’ risks (especially the risks related to revenue and investment in 
rolling stock). Formalisation and a clear allocation of responsibilities limit transaction costs. 
Ultimately, institutional transition costs are relevant, as when, e.g., a shift occurs from cooper-
ative to more competitive governance forms. 
Our results contribute to the ongoing debate on the effective and efficient design of gov-
ernance for public rail transport. Our in-depth analysis of the dimensions and drivers of trans-
action costs helps authorities and politicians to develop existing governance forms further to 
increase the overall welfare effects of public transport. As a promising topic for future research, 
we identify a need for a thorough quantitative analysis of transaction costs in terms of dimen-
sions and drivers. So far, quantitative results remain anecdotal. Future research could also in-
clude more case studies, especially of cooperative governance forms with long contract dura-
tions, as well as hybrid governance forms. 
The second paper, Is the mere threat enough? An empirical analysis about competitive 
tendering as a threat and cost efficiency in public bus transportation (Appendix A. 2, pp. 43–
65),4 examines how competition for the market indirectly affects cost efficiency of regional 
public bus services in Switzerland. An indirect effect may arise because PTAs can choose be-
tween competitive tendering or directly awarded public transport contracts. In the latter case, 
competitive tendering can be used as a threat to bus operating companies (BOCs), as well as 
being a basis for benchmarking. Indirect effects therefore appear in at least three circumstances. 
First, PTAs establish a credible threat by partially using competitive tendering in their area of 
responsibility. Second, BOCs exposed to competitive tendering reduce cost inefficiencies in 
services operated under non-tendered contracts as well. Third, PTAs use sophisticated bench-
marking based on revealed costs from competitively tendered contracts. Previous studies of the 
impact of governance instruments on cost efficiency exclusively focus on the direct effects of 
competitive tendering; no study so far has examined the potential indirect effects. 
 
4 A version of this paper has been published in Research in Transportation Economics. 
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I use panel data on the costs of all regional public bus lines in Switzerland. Based on a 
Cobb-Douglas cost function, I estimate a stochastic frontier model. Different operationalisa-
tions of the indirect effects of competitive tendering serve as explanatory variables for cost 
inefficiency.  
The results show two main indirect effects. First, BOCs with experience of competitive 
tendering generally operate significantly closer to the cost efficiency frontier than BOCs with-
out such experience. Second, cost efficiency scores increase when PTAs introduce sophisticated 
(model-based) benchmarking. The fact that a PTA starts using competitive tendering has a sig-
nificant positive effect on cost efficiency of non-tendered contracts in most but not all models. 
One explanation for the latter result is that the threat to use competitive tendering may not be 
credible in all instances.  
By finding evidence for indirect effects of competitive tendering, the paper contributes to 
the ongoing debate on effective and efficient governance forms for regional public transport. 
Exploiting the indirect effects of competitive tendering could be a major feature of a hybrid 
governance form. It would allow PTAs to push BOCs closer to the cost efficiency frontier while 
not mechanically applying competitive tendering. This leaves room for exploiting the ad-
vantages of cooperative instruments.5  
The preliminary insights of the second paper should be complemented with similar studies 
on this issue, e.g., in a different regulatory context. In addition, future research could focus on 
various aspects of a hybrid governance form. One example is the optimal design of combining 
cooperative and competitive governance instruments. Another, broader research question com-
plements the focus on cost efficiency by assessing how different governance forms affect inno-
vation, customer orientation, and, ultimately, passenger numbers. 
I now turn to the third paper, where we study team production using data from professional 
team sports. Empirically examining research questions in economics by exploiting the abun-
dance of professional sports data fits well with the research interests at Professor Dietl’s chair. 
Accordingly, Prof. Dietl and Dr. Orlowski are co-authoring this paper with myself. Professional 
sports have often been used as a real world laboratory in economic research. In particular, sport 
settings occasionally allow quasi-experiments to identify causal effects (Kahn, 2000), as sports 
contests take place in rather controlled environments and under well-defined sets of standard-
ised rules (Rosen & Sanderson, 2001). Inputs, outputs, and outcomes can be clearly identified 
 
5 In Switzerland, the current regulatory reform is going in that direction. However, no substantial increase 
in the use of competitive tendering is planned (FOT, 2020a). 
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and measured. Nowadays, data on, e.g., individual performance during sports contests is abun-
dant, detailed, and of high quality. Professional sport therefore provides a promising setting for 
examining research questions beyond the sports context alone. One example is the economics 
of team production. 
In the third paper, The importance of high performing team members in complex team work. 
Results from quasi-experiments in professional team sports (Appendix A. 3, pp. 67–88), we 
study peer effects of high performing team members in complex team production. Previous 
studies of peer effects in teams usually examine sequential tasks or settings with few interac-
tions among team members. Instead, we focus on reciprocally interdependent team production, 
which is prevalent in many industries (e.g., R&D, software development, professional sports, 
engineering). Reciprocal interdependence means close, constant, often ad-hoc interaction 
among multiple team members. We empirically examine the effects of high performing team 
members on other team members’ individual performance in terms of efficiency, output, risk 
taking, and task allocation. 
For this purpose, we use play-by-play data from professional basketball games in the Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA). To identify peer effects, we exploit unexpected injury 
dropouts of high performing players during a game. This quasi-experimental setting allows us 
to use a difference-in-difference estimation approach. We compare the change in players’ indi-
vidual performance over time within a game using two groups. In the first group (treatment 
group), a high performing player drops out due to an injury. In the second group (control group), 
no high performing player drops out. 
We find that, after an injury dropout of a high performing player, the other players of the 
team continue to fulfil their tasks as efficiently as before. However, they increase risk, reduce 
output, and divide tasks more evenly among themselves. These effects occur primarily when 
the high performing player has an integrative, team-oriented role within the team (compared to 
a rather self-oriented role). In addition, we observe that the subgroup of other high performing 
players, who do not drop out, try to compensate for the absent high performing player by in-
creasing their output. They could be interpreted as trying to step out of the shadow of their high 
performing peer. 
The empirical analysis of peer effects (especially of high performing team members) in 
reciprocally interdependent team production has received little attention in the literature so far. 
We fill this gap by showing that in such contexts high performing team members alter other 
team members’ individual performance in various ways. We argue that, although behavioural 
6 
concepts may play a certain role in explaining these results, the facilitating nature of high per-
forming team members is the central mechanism behind the observed peer effects. 
Future research could deepen understanding of the importance of high performing team 
members. The insights of the third paper might be extended by studying how other team mem-
bers’ effort levels and routines of interaction depend on high performing team members. An-
other related research question is the role and importance of high performing team members in 
critical situations. The professional sports setting again offers a promising opportunity to study 
these research questions.  
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This article addresses the transaction costs of different governance forms in regional public rail 
transport by comparing Germany’s competitive contract awarding model with Switzerland’s 
direct contract awarding model. Using a multiple case study approach with contrasting cases, 
we propose a concept of transaction costs with four dimensions: the awarding procedure, the 
institutional framework, the provision of system services, and the impact of learning and inno-
vation. We then identify drivers of transaction costs in both governance forms. In Germany’s 
competitive governance form, public transport authorities (PTAs) must ensure effective com-
petition using different instruments, and transaction costs are reduced by means of a clear def-
inition and allocation of responsibilities. In Switzerland’s cooperative governance form, costly 
competition surrogates serve to overcome information asymmetries, while an informal and 
trusting culture of cooperation prevents high transaction costs. Factors such as the complexity 
of different kinds or unforeseen behaviour by PTAs increase transaction costs with either gov-
ernance form. Our results suggest that transaction costs are not a legitimate argument against 
competition for the market. However, introducing it in Switzerland’s regional public rail 
transport would trigger high institutional transition costs and necessitate a change in culture. 
 
† A version of this paper has been published as Wegelin, P., von Arx, W. (2016). The impact of alternative 
governance forms of regional public rail transport on transaction costs. Case evidence from Germany and 
Switzerland. Research in Transportation Economics 59, 133–142. This article is © Elsevier, whose permis-
sion has been granted for this version to appear here. The paper is based on a research report published as 




In most European countries, regional public transport (RPT) authorities mandate transport op-
erating companies (TOCs) as contracting partners to provide RPT services.1 Two distinctive 
ideal types of governance apply: the competitive tendering model, i.e., competition for the mar-
ket, and the cooperative model involving the direct awarding of contracts. Today, efficient use 
of the large volumes of public funds devoted to RPT is a major policy concern, especially given 
the substantial increase in the demand for RPT that is expected in many places. Therefore, 
optimal governance of RPT in terms of cost efficiency, quality, customer orientation, and inno-
vation on the one hand and transaction costs on the other hand are of major interest.  
The primary focus of our study is on transaction costs. Although the choice of optimal RPT 
governance forms has been discussed in the literature, van de Velde and Beck (2010), Wallis et 
al. (2010), and others state that more knowledge of transaction costs is needed to be able to 
compare the costs and benefits. In the political debate, transaction costs are occasionally put 
forward as an argument against competitive tendering (Hanstein, 2014; SBB, 2014). We believe 
that a better understanding of transaction costs may support improvements to and advances in 
RPT governance. However, to the best of our knowledge, no detailed and comprehensive study 
of the transaction costs of different RPT governance forms exists to this day. We therefore seek 
to shed light on the following research questions: What types or dimensions of transaction costs 
emerge within the two governance forms—competitive vs. cooperative—for PTAs, TOCs, and 
possibly other stakeholders? Which transaction costs depend on the governance form, and 
which transaction costs are attributed to other factors? What are the relevant drivers of these 
transaction costs? Finally, how high are these transaction costs likely to be?  
By answering these research questions, our paper contributes to the ongoing debate in both 
academia and practice on optimal governance forms in RPT. We analyse our research questions 
using a comparative case study approach exploring multiple contrasting cases from Germany 
(the competitive governance form) and Switzerland (the cooperative governance form). We do 
not find evidence that the level of transaction costs of one governance form is substantially 
higher than in the case of the other. What differs is where and why transaction costs occur, 
which relates directly to the institutions, actors, practices, and levels of trust among stakehold-
ers associated with the respective governance form. With regard to the particular drivers of 
 
1 According to legal definitions in both Germany and Switzerland, RPT is passenger transportation within a 
region with average distances of no longer than 50 kilometres or travel time no longer than one hour. Alt-
hough we use the term RPT, we only consider railway transport and leave aside bus transport (unless explic-
itly stated). 
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transaction costs, the main difference between the two governance forms is the way PTAs en-
sure that TOCs produce satisfactory RPT services in terms of cost efficiency, service levels, 
and quality. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section summarises the rele-
vant literature. Section 3 presents the empirical context, namely, the cases we are analysing. In 
section 4, we describe the qualitative research design. Results are provided in section 5, fol-
lowed by a discussion and conclusion to the paper in section 6. 
 
2. Literature review 
The existing body of literature on awarding mechanisms, transaction costs, and public transport 
governance provides a valuable basis for an in-depth analysis of transaction costs in RPT gov-
ernance. This section provides a summary of the relevant literature. 
 
2.1 Competitive tendering vs. direct awarding in public transport 
PTAs use competitive tendering to enhance cost efficiency, given a certain level of output and 
service quality (Augustin & Walter, 2010; Lalive & Schmutzler, 2011). A sine qua non for 
achieving this is a functioning bidding market to keep the market contestable (Kain, 2006; 
Koller, 2012; Laffont & Tirole, 1993): entry barriers need to be low (Beck, 2011a), and tender-
ing has to take place regularly (Hensher & Wallis, 2005). Important barriers to entry include 
revenue risks, complexity, high transaction costs, and the incumbent’s competitive advantages 
(Augustin and Walter, 2010; Beck, 2011; Boitani and Cambini, 2006; Gross, 2009).2 There is, 
however, a trade-off between low entry barriers and economies of scale, scope, and density 
(Augustin & Walter, 2010). Moreover, to provide system services, PTAs must find a solution 
to overcome the free-rider problem of competitive environments (Gross, 2009; Kern, 2014). In 
other words, there is a trade-off between the efficiency of subsystems (through competition) 
and the efficiency of the entire system (through integration) (Finger et al., 2012). Transaction 
costs are occasionally mentioned as a disadvantage of competitive tendering, primarily in first-
round tenders (Bajari et al., 2008; Lalive & Schmutzler, 2011; Wallis et al., 2010). Laffont and 
Tirole (1993: 307) summarise generally: “Organizing auctions … is costly. Procurers incur the 
 
2 The incumbent may have specific knowledge about, e.g., revenues, which gives it a considerable advantage 
in the bidding procedure if no specific regulation applies (such as the obligation to share data on revenues). 
This potential caveat of competition for the market relates to Williamson’s “fundamental transformation” 
(Williamson, 1985: 61). Even if there is lively competition at the bidding stage, the subsequent contractual 
relationship will be bilateral. This (temporal) monopoly position gives the incumbent a potential competitive 
advantage for future competitive tenders.  
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‘processing cost’ of writing requests for proposals and reading the proposals, making sure that 
the language and terms of the proposals are unambiguous. Potential suppliers also spend sub-
stantial amounts of time preparing contracts … . To this must be added the lengthy assessment 
of subjective attributes of bids … . Certainly, such transaction costs exist with a single potential 
supplier, but they tend to grow with the number of bidders”. Another source of transaction costs 
are unforeseen ex-post negotiations (Hensher & Stanley, 2008; Mees, 2007), service disrup-
tions, or the bankruptcy of TOCs (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2006).  
Compared to competitive tendering, direct awarding with negotiations is more flexible and 
eases the problem of dealing with high levels of complexity. Long-term collaboration between 
PTA and TOC enables professional cooperation and fosters mutual trust. On the other hand, 
mutual trust is a premise of exploiting the advantages of negotiations (Bajari et al., 2008; 
Hensher & Stanley, 2008). Mutual trust can substitute for detailed contracts and costly lawsuits 
in cases of conflict, thus reducing transaction costs (Hensher & Stanley, 2010; Merkert & 
Hensher, 2013; Parker & Hartley, 2003). To achieve cost efficiency with direct awarding, how-
ever, it is important to use incentive contracts, since information asymmetry and incumbent 
bargaining power still exist (Bajari et al., 2008; Lalive & Schmutzler, 2011). In addition, if 
awarding occurs regularly, TOCs have barely any incentive to decrease costs because profits 
are skimmed, and losses result in higher levels of compensation (Finger & Holterman, 2013). 
Incentive contracts may be more suitable than competitive tendering in achieving soft goals, 
such as service quality, and they may have lower transaction costs (Bajari et al., 2008; Hensher 
& Wallis, 2005). Direct awarding, conversely, can increase transaction costs, e.g., if complex 
and data intensive incentive schemes are used and when negotiations become lengthy (Hensher 
& Wallis, 2005; Koller, 2012).  
Empirical studies of awarding procedures in public transport often focus on the impacts of 
competitive tendering on cost efficiency, service levels, and service quality (Beck et al., 2007; 
Hensher & Wallis, 2005; Koller, 2012; Lalive & Schmutzler, 2008, 2011; Pollitt & Smith, 
2002). There is a consensus that competitive tendering usually reduces compensation per train-
kilometre and leads to increased service levels and higher quality. For Germany’s RPT, Lalive 
& Schmutzler (2011) and mofair & Netzwerk Privatbahnen (2009) quantify the savings in com-
pensation payments per train-kilometre at 26 percent. Some studies, in contrast, reveal cost 
increases, although it is difficult to elicit the reasons for this (Boitani & Cambini, 2006; Hensher 
et al., 2007; Kain, 2006; Nash & Wolański, 2010). Others report lower unit costs after first-
round tenders, but rising costs in follow-up tenders (Hensher & Stanley, 2008; Hensher & 
Wallis, 2005). Wallis et al. (2010) conclude from a study of bus services in Adelaide, Australia, 
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that direct awarding with negotiations and incentive contracts is preferred to re-tendering when 
the incumbent is already operating efficiently. In this case, re-tendering does not increase effi-
ciency but still increases transaction costs.  
In summary, the literature on the governance of public transport provides valuable insights 
into how different governance forms and contractual designs work in practice. The studies usu-
ally analyse outcomes such as cost efficiency. They occasionally mention transaction costs, but 
do not consider them systematically or comprehensively.  
 
2.1 Transaction cost economics and principal-agent theory 
Transaction Cost Economics, an important theme in New Institutional Economics, focuses on 
the alignment of transactions to governance forms. Central to the analysis are ex-post risks in 
contractual relationships, such as bilateral dependencies, unknown quality, and opportunism. 
Transaction costs are compared with efficiency of production in choosing an appropriate gov-
ernance form (Coase, 1937, 1960; Williamson, 1996). Usually, three characteristics of transac-
tions determine the level of transaction: uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity, the last 
being rated the most important. Governance forms are optimally chosen depending on the pe-
culiarity of these characteristics, as well as on the institutional, social, and technological envi-
ronment (Mizutani & Uranishi, 2012; van de Velde et al., 2006; Williamson, 1996, 2000).  
The literature provides different definitions of transaction costs (e.g., Arrow, 1969; Coase, 
1937; Dietl, 2007; Merkert, 2010; Williamson, 1996), which are sometimes separated from 
institutional transition costs, i.e., the costs of institutional change. Institutional transition costs 
are a form of dynamic transaction costs that may also include efforts by political decision-
makers to overcome resistance to this institutional change (Garrick et al., 2013; Marshall, 
2013).  
It has often been argued that modern information and communication technology (ICT) 
minimises the importance of transaction costs. Automative innovations, e.g., may “lead to an 
overall shift toward proportionally more market coordination” (Malone et al., 1987: 484). Ap-
plied to the present context, ICT may reduce costs in governing public transport and thereby 
facilitate market-oriented reforms such as privatisation (Preston, 2002). However, intensified 
use of ICT can increase complexity and may require different forms of coordination, thereby 
increasing transaction costs (Cordella, 2006; Den Butter, 2012). 
Principal-agent theory is another useful approach for analysing PTA-TOC relationships, a 
classic case of the principal-agent problem. Principal-agent theory primarily relates to the align-
ment of the principal’s and agent’s respective incentives under information asymmetry. As 
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principals, PTAs try to overcome information asymmetry with the agent (the TOCs) by deploy-
ing instruments such as incentive contracts or tight monitoring. In addition to the costs of ap-
plying these instruments, there is usually a welfare loss (residual loss) because of the remaining 
information asymmetry. Both costs are referred to as agency costs (Picot, 1991).  
Although transaction costs in PTA-TOC relationships have recently attracted some atten-
tion, they have rarely been addressed empirically. In general, increased cost efficiency after a 
competitive tender indicates a favourable cost-benefit ratio from the TOCs’ point of view. For 
British rail franchises, Merkert (2010) observes a reduction in TOCs’ transaction costs over 
time that is achieved through learning effects and mutual trust between stakeholders. Nash and 
Wolański (2010) report high transaction costs for competitive tendering in the UK, which, how-
ever, are offset by cost efficiency gains. Both studies only incorporate the internal costs of 
TOCs and thus neglect consulting costs and PTAs’ costs. In the study of bus services in Ade-
laide mentioned above, Wallis et al. (2010) find significantly higher transaction costs for com-
petitive tendering than for direct awarding with negotiations. Beck et al. (2007) analyse two 
competitively tendered rail services in Germany and state that transaction costs only represent 
a small fraction of production cost savings. These two studies break down transaction costs into 
different categories and allocate them to different stakeholders. However, they do not analyse 
the underlying drivers of transaction costs in further detail. Resch and Neth (2006) report much 
higher transaction costs for German railway TOCs with competitive tendering than with direct 
awarding. The authors explain this result with reference to the need to build new institutions 
and to reallocate the responsibilities for system services to PTAs. Thus, they use a definition of 
transaction costs that goes beyond the mere costs of contract awarding and includes, e.g., insti-
tutional transition costs. Their study, however, focuses on transaction cost of competitive ten-
dering and neglects those of direct awarding by assumption. Finally, some studies explicitly 
mention particular drivers of transaction costs. Kain (2006) reports that high transaction costs 
in the UK and Australia occur in renegotiations after the original bids in competitive tenders 
have proved too optimistic. Merkert and Hensher (2013) find transaction costs to be higher in 
Australian bus RPT than in regional air transport because of the stronger trusting relationships 
and clear but simple contracts in the latter case.  
In summary, despite the increased awareness of transaction costs in governing public 
transport, no study covers them in a comprehensive way. Nevertheless, the existing studies 




3. Empirical context 
 
3.1 Germany 
Germany’s railway reform of 1994 was a reaction to the shrinking importance of RPT since the 
1950s and to the poor performance and high financial risks to public budgets posed by the then 
state monopolists, the Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn (Schwilling et al., 
2014). Under the reform, responsibilities were reallocated, and funding was reorganised. The 
ordering principle, the compensation principle, and competitive tendering were introduced.3 In 
addition, the federal states were given more responsibilities and more discretion (Aderle, 2013; 
Monopolkommission, 2011). Even though legal certainty about the mandatory use of competi-
tive tendering in RPT has only recently been achieved,4 several PTAs began to award contracts 
competitively right after the reform. Besides the usual competitive tendering procedure, under 
certain circumstances PTAs can apply the so-called competitive negotiation procedure, which 
includes negotiations with bidders (Achenbach et al., 2013).5 Competition for the market in 
Germany’s RPT is usually restricted to service provision and the procurement and maintenance 
of rolling stock. Other functions on the tactical and strategic level are provided by PTAs, such 
as the integration of services in timetables and fares, or have remained with the incumbent 
holding company, the Deutsche Bahn (DB), such as infrastructure management and provision 
of real-time customer information.6  
Germany is widely recognised as an example of good practice regarding public transport 
liberalisation and competition in RPT (Kummer et al., 2013). After the railway reform (and 
with ongoing experience), service levels, cost efficiency, and service quality have risen impres-
sively (Aderle, 2013; Schwilling & Bunge, 2014). The incumbent DB Regio is still the market 
leader, although competitors’ market share rose to 27.4 percent of total train-kilometres in 2014 
(mofair & Netzwerk Privatbahnen, 2014). Table 1 provides a brief summary of our German 
 
3 PTAs define the public transport services they want to procure from a TOC (ordering principle). The PTA 
and TOC agree in a contract on these services and on compensation for the expected residual costs the TOC 
cannot recover from revenues (compensation principle) (Desmaris, 2014). 
4 Decision X ZB 4/10 of the Federal Court of Justice, 2011.  
5 PTAs use competitive negotiation procedures when the service being provided is complex or has novel 
challenges, such as awarding an entire suburban railway network. In such instances, it is often not possible 
(or is subject to considerable risk) to describe the required service definitively at the outset. Competitive 
negotiation procedures can also be used when no suitable bids were submitted initially (e.g., with respect to 
the maximum possible compensation payment). PTAs and bidders then can discuss open questions about 
service and contract specifications, thus contributing jointly to outcome optimisation, avoiding costly written 
question and answer games, and reducing the risk of legal consequences. 
6 The different levels of planning, control, and decision-making in the provision of public transport services 
are conceptualised in the STO (Strategic–Tactical–Operational) framework (van de Velde, 1999b). 
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case studies. All three represent state of the art competitive tenders, and in all cases the PTAs 
used a competitive negotiation procedure. 
 
Table 1 Description of German cases. 




 Suburban railway network in metropolitan area 
 Three lots; nine lines; about 15 million train-kilometres per 
year—fourth largest suburban railway network in Germany 
 Highly experienced and professional PTA 
 First-round tender 
 Gross contract; comprehensive incentive contract 




 Incumbent TOC  
(DB Regio) 





 Part of suburban railway network in metropolitan area 
 Two lines; about 3.6 million train-kilometres per year—part 
of the third largest suburban railway network in Germany 
 Highly experienced and professional PTA 
 First-round tender 
 Gross contract; comprehensive incentive contract  









 Large rural RPT network 
 Two lots; 16 lines; about 10 million train-kilometres per 
year 
 Several PTAs involved 
 First-round tender 
 Operator change; partially net contract; quality incentive 
contract 
 Contract duration: 22.5 years 









Switzerland reformed its RPT in the wake of liberalisation in the European Union (EU) 
(Desmaris, 2014). The ordering principle and compensation principle were introduced. Can-
tonal PTAs and the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) order and fund RPT services jointly, 
funding being shared equally (shared ordering). Cantonal PTAs take the lead in the awarding 
procedure but are supported by the FOT, which is also responsible for nationwide coordination, 
standardisation, and benchmarking.7 Contract duration is two years. PTAs negotiate exclusively 
with the incumbents, which are owned by the state and hold transport licences for their services 
for as long as 25 years (Finger et al., 2012). As an extension to the two-year ordinary transport 
contracts, PTAs and TOCs can negotiate target agreement contracts with stipulations regarding 
cost efficiency and quality goals for longer periods. Competitive tendering is a voluntary option, 
 
7 Benchmarking of cost, revenue, and service level KPIs is used to support the evaluation of TOCs’ offers. 
There is, however, no benchmarking in terms of yardstick competition nationally. It is only recently that 
some cantonal PTAs have started to develop a model-based benchmarking approach (see Shleifer, 1985, for 
a formal theory of yardstick competition, and Dalen & Gómez-Lobo, 2003, for an application in public 
transport).  
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but it has never yet been used for public rail transport.8 When new RPT services are introduced, 
however, PTAs sometimes invite preselected TOCs to submit a bid, thereby creating a degree 
of competition for the market.  
In general, Swiss RPT is characterised by a particularly high level of system integration, 
with frequent services, synchronised timetables, integrated connections, comprehensive fare 
integration, and high levels of punctuality (Finger et al., 2012). The Schweizerische Bundesbah-
nen (SBB) is the largest incumbent and has extensive responsibilities for system services such 
as timetable-scheduling, supply-planning, and real-time customer information. Even in the ab-
sence of competitive instruments, reforms are deemed to have led to increased cost efficiency, 
higher service levels, and better service quality (Desmaris, 2014; Ecoplan, 2014). Swiss tax-
payers heavily subsidise RPT in absolute terms.9 Financial sustainability therefore poses a big 
challenge for the future (Desmaris, 2014; Meister, 2012). Table 2 briefly summarises the Swiss 
cases. 
 
Table 2 Description of Swiss cases. 





 Rather small suburban railway network 
 Five lines; about 4 million train-kilometres per year; ex-
tending to Germany and France 
 Several PTAs involved 
 Net contract; ‘small’ quality incentive contract 
 Lead PTA (Kanton  
Baselland BL) 
 National PTA (FOT) 




 Largest, most complex railway network in Switzerland 
 14 lines; about 19 million train-kilometres per year 
 Lead PTA is the most professional PTA in Switzerland; 
several PTAs involved 
 Net contract; comprehensive incentive contract (target 
agreement contract) 
 Lead PTA (Zürcher 
Verkehrsverbund ZVV) 
 National PTA (FOT) 






8 There was one restricted competitive tendering call in the 1990s with two preselected bidders, resulting in 
the so-called Seelinie being transferred from the incumbent Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB) to the en-
trant Mittelthurgaubahn (MThB). Because the legal framework at that time did not include competitive ten-
dering as an awarding mechanism, this procedure was justified as an informal experiment (van de Velde, 
1999a). 
9 In 2012, PTAs’ compensation for RPT was more than CHF 1.8 bn (Federal Department of the Environment, 
Transport, Energy and Communications DETEC, 2016), amounting to around USD 1.9 bn and EUR 1.5 bn 
using average exchange rates for 2012 (Swiss National Bank, 2016). Approximately two-thirds go into rail 
RPT and one-third into bus RPT. If more money is required, stakeholders usually find a compromise to cover 
the gap (soft budget constraint). In contrast, public compensation for the operation of rail RPT in Germany 
amounted to EUR 5.75 bn in 2012 (Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen VDV, 2013).  
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4. Methodology 
Because of the pronounced exploratory nature of our research questions, we follow a qualitative 
research design.10 Our empirical research method is based on grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We apply a multiple case study approach with con-
trasting cases to reveal the similarities and differences between the two governance forms 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2014). Cases are selected according to theoretical sampling using 
different criteria derived from the literature on public transport governance and from initial 
discussions and interviews with industry representatives and experts (Table A 1 in the Appen-
dix). The intention is to cover a wide range of up-to-date institutional settings, practices, and 
challenges in respect of both governance forms. Ultimately, the goal is to achieve qualitative 
representativeness that allows analytical generalisations (Yin, 2014). We consider German and 
Swiss RPT to be sufficiently similar and, at the same time, as sufficiently different to be com-
pared with each other, as well as to ensure mutual learning (Beck et al., 2007; Gross, 2013; 
Kummer et al., 2013).11 
Based on an extensive literature review and on the discussions and expert interviews men-
tioned above, we develop a conceptual frame of reference for collecting and analysing the data. 
The frame of reference consists of a matrix with different dimensions of transaction costs and 
corresponding working hypotheses on how institutions, actors and their practices, and contexts 
affect transaction costs. We collect data in semi-structured guided interviews using interview 
guides we develop based on the frame of reference.12 Despite the use of interview guides, in-
terviewees are completely free in how they answer the questions, which gives the interviews a 
narrative character. We complement the interviews with document analysis (e.g., of tendering 
documents). If new insights emerge from the case study interviews, we adapt the frame of ref-
erence and the interview guides accordingly (Flick, 2012). We stop gathering data when inter-
views no longer reveal any new information (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Following the procedure proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), we then apply qualitative 
content analysis with repeated coding of interview transcripts, thus gradually identifying the 
relevant dimensions and drivers of transaction costs. To check for the plausibility of our quali-
tative results, we also collect some quantitative data.13 Finally, all the results are discussed with 
 
10 A more comprehensive description of the research design can be found in the Appendix to this paper. 
11 For a detailed overview of the two institutional frameworks (and others in Europe), see Finger et al. (2012). 
12 We conduct nine case study interviews with one to three interviewees of a duration of 60 to 180 minutes 
each (Table 1, Table 2, and Table A 1). 
13 Quantitative data on transaction costs in RPT is sparse and incomplete. At best, these data constitute anec-
dotal evidence and provide illustrations relating to the qualitative findings. 
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an expert panel consisting of industry representatives from Germany and Switzerland. Thereby, 





5.1 Dimensions of transaction costs 
We propose a comprehensive concept of transaction costs that includes the four dimensions 
presented below. 
Contract awarding procedure. Here, all classical transaction costs (information costs, ne-
gotiation costs etc.) occur and are treated as static transaction costs, given the institutional 
framework.  
Institutional framework. To be able to award contracts, a corresponding institutional frame-
work has to be established and continuously adapted to a changing environment. By institu-
tional framework, we broadly mean a reliable legal framework, qualified PTAs, and effective 
and efficient decision-making processes to ensure the functioning of awarding procedures. Es-
tablishing a suitable institutional framework entails a cost that Marshall (2013) refers to as in-
stitutional transition costs. Depending on their design and quality, formal institutions, as well 
as informal institutions like business culture, affect the level of transaction costs.  
System services. From a customer’s point of view, the integration of fares and timetables 
and timely and comprehensive customer information are crucial because they decrease gener-
alised user costs (Gross, 2009; Preston, 2010). Such system services have to be provided either 
by one powerful and qualified stakeholder (e.g., the incumbent or a PTA), or through coopera-
tion between different stakeholders. Accordingly, transaction costs and institutional transition 
costs establishing the corresponding institutional framework may differ. Moreover, if the re-
sponsible actors fail to provide adequate system services, customers experience welfare losses 
(Preston, 2010).  
Dynamic perspective. We start from the assumption that transaction costs, ceteris paribus, 
decline over time due to learning effects. In a dynamic environment, however, the ability to 
adapt flexibly to new circumstances and opportunities is crucial in terms of “adaptive effi-
ciency” (North, 1992: 9). Besides the potential decrease in transaction costs through learning 
effects, this fourth dimension therefore contains transaction costs related to adaptation, innova-
tion, and the advancement of RPT.  
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Figure 1 summarises the four dimensions of transaction costs. Within a given institutional 
framework, transaction costs are incurred in awarding procedures and in the provision of cus-
tomer-friendly system services. In the dynamic perspective, adaptation and learning influence 
transaction costs, both positively and negatively. If institutional change occurs, e.g., in the di-
rection of a competitive governance form, institutional transition costs accrue. Subsequently, 
the new (or adapted) institutional framework affect the other dimensions of transaction costs. 
 
 
Figure 1 Four dimensions of transaction costs within RPT governance. 
 
5.2 Drivers of transaction costs 
 
Independent drivers of transaction cost  
In public debates, some drivers of transaction costs are considered to be a direct consequence 
of competition, even though in principle they are independent of the governance form. In other 
words, these transaction costs appear in either governance form to a significant extent and for 
similar reasons. We identify four such drivers. The first three are potentially reinforced by the 
degree of formalisation of contractual relationships, which in our case studies is more prevalent 
the competitive governance form than in the cooperative governance form (see below). 
The number of stakeholders drives transaction costs by increasing the need for coordination 
and the probability of conflicts over goals, budgets etc. This feature is more prevalent in Swit-
zerland than in Germany due to shared ordering and the spatial structure of many small PTAs 
(political borders rarely coincide with the boundaries of RPT networks). If the number of stake-
holders is low, fewer interfaces have to be managed.  
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Unforeseen changes and adjustments during awarding procedures or contract periods heav-
ily increase transaction costs. Work has to be redone, signing the contract is delayed, stakehold-
ers and potential bidders are discouraged, and planning reliability declines. An example from 
Switzerland demonstrates this in an obvious way: in 2014, a nationwide fare increase made it 
necessary to recalculate and renegotiate all current RPT contracts.  
Technological, legal, and operational complexity affects transaction costs, a result well 
known from Transaction Cost Economics. It is more difficult to deal with complexity in long-
term contracts (see below). For Germany’s PTAs, one way to cope with complexity is to use 
competitive negotiation procedures. In contrast, short contract periods in Switzerland’s RPT 
ease the handling of complexity. The same is true of more flexible contracts elements, such as 
regular meetings between the parties and liberal adjustment clauses. 
Learning effects result from repetition, experience, standardisation, and sample documents. 
Learning effects allow PTAs to deal with higher levels of complexity. A common strategy in 
the competitive governance form is to start competitive tendering with isolated lines in periph-
eral areas and then move on to networks that are more complex. In addition, legal certainty, 
institutional stability, and extensive use of ICT (e.g., electronic tendering documents) lower 
transaction costs. However, new internal and external challenges appear that may substantially 
increase transaction costs. Examples are data requirements for electronic controlling and mon-
itoring or the global financial crisis of 2008, which held up the funding of new rolling stock by 
TOCs. In the latter example, the governance form clearly matters, as the results in the next 
section demonstrate.  
 
Transaction cost drivers directly related to the governance form 
We identify five drivers of transaction costs that directly depend on whether the governance 
form is competitive or cooperative. In the following, we assess how and to what extent these 
drivers appear in the two governance forms. 
The market maker function of PTAs. PTAs have to achieve the goals set by political deci-
sion-makers. One instrument available to them is the awarding procedure. 
 Relevance to the competitive governance form. To attract bidders, PTAs must maintain a 
level playing field and keep the market attractive. This requires elimination of the incum-
bent’s potential for discrimination or its competitive advantage, e.g., that stemming from 
public ownership. Ensuring the market remains attractive has become one of the most 
important and most challenging tasks for PTAs in Germany. The key lever here is risk 
allocation. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, external funding of new rolling stock 
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has become very difficult for many TOCs except the incumbent DB Regio. This created a 
strong competitive imbalance. To keep the market attractive for DB Regio’s competitors, 
PTAs have developed instruments such as state credit guarantees or set up their own roll-
ing stock companies. These instruments are complex, especially from a legal point of view. 
Transaction costs can therefore grow high. Similarly, many of DB Regio’s competitors are 
barely able to carry the risk to revenues over a contract period of up to 22 years. Often, 
only the incumbent has the relevant data on revenues. PTAs thus usually offer gross cost 
contracts. Moreover, TOCs do not have to bear all the risks of production costs such as 
fluctuations in energy prices (which are bound to a public price index) or train path prices 
(paid directly by the PTA).  
 Relevance to the cooperative governance form. There is no relevance since there is no 
competition for the market. Swiss TOCs can cope more easily with different risks. They 
profit from possible monopoly prices, long-term transport licences, very short contract 
periods, and public ownership.  
 Summary. One of the major drivers of transaction costs in Germany’s competitive gov-
ernance form is PTAs’ efforts to sustain the bidding market. This primarily involves the 
transfer of different kinds of risks from TOCs to PTAs. 
Formalisation of long-term contractual relationships. Unambiguous descriptions of the 
desired service, subsequent conversion into a contract, and clear allocation of responsibilities 
are challenging tasks in the current context, as they substantially increase transaction costs. This 
is particularly true if the level of complexity is high and the contract duration long. Ambiguous 
contract specification can lead to complaints and legal consequences. Comprehensive formali-
sation, however, also has a restraining effect on transaction costs through the clarification of 
rights, obligations, tasks, and responsibilities. During the contract period, a degree of calm de-
scends, and TOCs can concentrate on providing transport services. Formalisation can partly be 
replaced by mutual trust among stakeholders. 
 Relevance to the competitive governance form. Because of long contract durations and the 
necessity of equal treatment of all (potential) bidders, formalisation is indispensable. The 
specification and awarding criteria must be watertight. All relevant details have to be 
known at the bidding stage. Any potential for misinterpretation must be eliminated. Costly 
conflict resolution in court has been prevalent in Germany’s RPT. During the contract 
period, specifications can only be modified within narrow limits. Contracts are therefore 
quite static. Significant events during the contract period (e.g., financial problems or sub-
stantial adjustments to service levels) provoke high transaction costs.  
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 Relevance to the cooperative governance form. Regular negotiations, business continuity, 
informal collaboration, and trusting partnerships in Switzerland’s RPT are a substitute for 
comprehensive formalisation. Stakeholders solve conflicts through dialogue. This has a 
restraining effect on transaction costs. However, informal collaboration may also increase 
transaction costs. In Switzerland’s RPT, there is a strong focus on quality improvements, 
innovation, and secondary political objectives (such as fostering regional development). 
This has two reasons. First, stakeholders implicitly face a soft budget constraint (footnote 
9). Second, the state often simultaneously takes on the role of owner of a TOC and the 
PTA. Combined with an informal collaboration culture, this results in a high degree of 
activism, with regular modifications to service specifications and frequent launches of 
projects to advance RPT. A focus on innovation and high levels of flexibility, while un-
doubtedly promoting the further development of RPT, reduces planning reliability, in-
creases the need for coordination, and this comes with substantial transaction costs. As a 
result, stakeholders start to establish more formalised relationships, e.g., by using target 
agreement contracts with a minimal duration of four years. In addition, formalisation is 
growing due to tighter public budgets, the diverging goals of different PTAs, and higher 
degrees of complexity on different levels (such as the technological and legal environ-
ments). 
 Summary. The effect of formalisation on transaction costs is ambiguous. Both high levels 
(competitive governance form) and low levels (cooperative governance form) of formali-
sation lead to high transaction costs, but due to different causes. It is likely that transaction 
costs related to formalisation grow with contract duration and complexity, regardless of 
the governance form.  
Fragmentation of the market and the culture of collaboration. To provide customer-
friendly system services, cooperation between stakeholders is usually necessary. If the market 
is highly fragmented into numerous self-interested TOCs, cooperation may become difficult, 
e.g., due to free-riding (Gross, 2009). 
 Relevance to the competitive governance form. Competition can result in a dynamic mar-
ket structure with a high number of TOCs mainly focusing on their own costs, risks, and 
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profits. In Germany, responsibilities for system services have therefore been partly real-
located to PTAs (e.g., superordinate marketing and timetable integration).14 As a precon-
dition, PTAs must acquire the appropriate knowhow. With regard to cooperation culture, 
interviewees in Germany mentioned the legalistic behaviour of the incumbent at the outset 
of the competitive area, e.g., deliberately delaying tendering procedures by initiating legal 
cases. Such behaviour requires even stronger formalisation and safeguarding (see above). 
Today, however, legal certainty is high, and legalistic behaviour and conflict resolution 
using legal instruments have decreased. Among stakeholders, a constructive and pragmatic 
culture of cooperation has emerged in the sense of “thin trust” (Hensher et al., 2007: 413), 
with a restraining effect on transaction costs.  
 Relevance to the cooperative governance form. In Switzerland, the number of TOCs is 
static. The most important stakeholder with regard to system services is the SBB. Coop-
eration is based on “thick trust” (Hensher et al., 2007: 413) and business continuity, which 
limits transaction costs. Naturally, however, TOCs primarily follow their own business 
interests. Therefore, PTAs still exert a substantial influence over system services. The high 
degree of system integration is often a consequence of the corresponding regulation. E.g., 
nationwide fare integration—one journey, one ticket—may be organised by the TOC as-
sociation. The law, however, states that only TOCs participating in nationwide fare inte-
gration are compensated—a genuinely effective incentive with low transaction costs.  
 Summary. Germany incurred high institutional transition costs after the reform. Respon-
sibility for several system services had to be reallocated, often to PTAs. Moreover, due to 
the fragmentation of the market and the competitive environment, transaction costs to es-
tablish the necessary level of cooperation are higher than in the cooperative governance 
form. This relates to the level of trust among stakeholders. Cooperation in the competitive 
governance form is based on thin trust, while we observe (partially) thick trust in the co-
operative governance form. Nevertheless, we do not find substantial differences in terms 
of transaction costs related to the provision of system services; what differs is the alloca-
tion of responsibilities.  
Incentive schemes and asymmetries of information. By using incentive schemes, PTAs aim 
to foster goals such as cost efficiency, passenger numbers, and service quality. Incentive 
 
14 Another reason for reallocating system service responsibilities is the potential for discrimination that re-
lates to some such services. 
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schemes have to be specified, negotiated, implemented, and managed, leading to transaction 
costs for both PTAs and TOCs. 
 Relevance to the competitive governance form. Incentive schemes are widely used by 
German PTAs. Most often the goal is to enhance quality, since TOCs might be tempted to 
reduce costs to the detriment of service quality.  
 Relevance to the cooperative governance form. PTA-TOC relationships in Switzerland are 
typical principal-agent relationships with distinctive asymmetries of information. To le-
gitimise the high amount of public funds devoted to RPT, PTAs use competition surrogates 
such as benchmarking, target agreement contracts, and open-book procedures, instruments 
that are often complex and require appropriate knowhow. Moreover, PTAs verify TOCs’ 
offers very carefully, leading to costly question and answer games and micromanagement 
of negotiations and contracts. Besides the transaction costs related to these activities, they 
potentially place burdens on mutual trust. In Switzerland, another feature may serve as a 
competition surrogate. Swiss voters’ high levels of support for public transport, as re-
vealed in many popular votes and often related to substantial public funding, pushes TOCs 
to deliver satisfactory results.  
 Summary. One of the major drivers of transaction costs in Switzerland’s RPT is PTAs 
using competition surrogates to overcome information asymmetries and legitimise the 
public funds devoted to RPT. By comparison, the transaction costs of incentive schemes 
applied in Germany to stipulate quality and ridership are substantially lower. 
Changing the operator imposes transaction costs and additional risks. A new TOC must 
acquire knowledge about the service and organise staff, rolling stock etc., in a timely fashion. 
Intense cooperation between the PTA, the incumbent, and the new TOC is necessary. Infor-
mation asymmetries may become an issue if staff, rolling stock, or maintenance facilities are 
transferred from the incumbent to the new TOC. The incumbents occasionally incur residual 
costs, while potential start-up difficulties by the new TOC affect customers negatively.  
 Relevance to the competitive governance form: Operator changes are an intrinsic feature 
of competition for the market. Although in Germany’s major market such changes usually 
work smoothly, there are still exceptions. In the case of Dieselnetz Südwest, the new TOC 
Netinera was not able to provide the contracted service level for half a year after severe 
start-up difficulties.15 In addition, because of the risk of losing a contract, TOCs’ limit 
 
15 Such negative examples are often put forward as an argument against competitive tendering, e.g., after the 
British private TOC National Express recently won the tender for S-Bahn Nurnberg. 
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investment and innovation to what pays off by the end of the contract period. This may 
have detrimental effects on innovation and advancing RPT. 
 Relevance to the cooperative governance form. There is no relevance since there is no 
competition for the market. 
 Summary. Operator changes are a direct consequence of competition for the market, and 
may lead, even when working smoothly, to significant transaction costs.  
In summary, we find substantial differences regarding where and why transaction costs 
accrue in the two governance forms we are comparing. The most important drivers in both cases 
relate to how PTAs strive to achieve optimal outcomes in terms of cost efficiency, quantity, and 
quality of RPT services. In the competitive governance form, PTAs use competitive tendering 
to obtain the best value for money. They must therefore continuously ensure that the bidding 
market works sufficiently well. In the cooperative governance form, conversely, PTAs use var-
ious competition surrogates to overcome information asymmetries and level bargaining power 
with TOCs. 
 
5.3 Quantitative comparisons 
As the availability of precise and comprehensive data on transaction costs in RPT governance 
is limited, we can only present rough estimates and indicators to establish the plausibility of our 
qualitative results. Moreover, we cannot disaggregate the estimates into the four dimensions 
outlined in section 5.1. The first comparison below is potentially more comprehensive, while 
the second only includes costs related to awarding contracts. 
 
Proportion of transaction costs in total costs 
One way to assess TOCs’ transaction costs quantitatively is to consider the proportion of over-
head costs in total costs (Merkert, 2010). Figure 2 shows the SBB’s average RPT cost structures 
in all Switzerland and for small and medium railway networks in the RMV area. The proportion 
of overhead costs is identical. For more complex RPT networks, we lack exact data for direct 
comparisons. The proportion of overhead costs, however, is higher regardless of the governance 
form, which we attribute to the higher level of complexity. 
We also look at the proportion of PTA staff assigned to contracting RPT by the RMV 
(Germany) and by the ZVV (Switzerland). Both are considered highly professional and expe-
rienced PTAs with similar tasks. We find that the two PTAs assign around the same proportion 




Figure 2 TOC cost structures: proportion of total costs per train-kilometre. Source: interviews. 
 
In summary, we do not find obvious differences in PTAs’ and TOCs’ transaction costs 
between the case studies considered.  
 
Transaction costs in awarding procedures 
Table 3 compares the transaction costs of awarding procedures between the competitive ten-
dering of S-Bahn Rhein-Main and the direct awarding of S-Bahn Zurich. The costs of both 
PTAs and TOCs (including unsuccessful bidders in the German case) are considered. Taking 
into account the contract duration and the length of the RPT network, the transaction costs seem 
to be slightly higher in the S-Bahn Rhein-Main case. For S-Bahn Zurich, however, we are not 
able to identify the transaction costs of establishing and managing the nine-year target agree-
ment contract. Moreover, experts consider the estimate of transaction costs for the S-Bahn Zur-
ich case to be at the lower boundary. Overall, transaction costs may therefore not differ sub-
stantially between these two particular awarding procedures. In either example, transaction 
costs are almost negligible compared to the total costs and compensation payments.  
Even if the transaction costs of awarding procedures do not differ substantially in amount, 
they are incurred at different stages: German PTAs are closely engaged in the preparation stage, 
e.g., compiling tender documents. Swiss PTAs devote a higher proportion of their time to ex-
amining and negotiating TOCs’ offers. TOCs in Germany work hard to write a potentially suc-
cessful bid, whereas Swiss TOCs have to negotiate and revise their initial offers. 
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Table 3 Comparison of transactions costs in awarding procedures (both in 2014). Exchange rate 
CHF/EUR=1.2 (at the end of 2014; Swiss National Bank, 2016). Source: interviews. 
 S-Bahn Rhein-Main (RMV) S-Bahn Zurich (ZVV) 
Total transaction costs  
(one contract period) 
EUR 5–7 million CHF 0.6 million (EUR 0.5 million)  
Annual transaction costs EUR 0.27–0.38 million CHF 0.3 million (EUR 0.25 million) 
Annual transaction costs per 
million train-kilometres 
EUR 15,000–21,000 CHF 16,000 (EUR 13,333) 
Miscellaneous  Three contracts; nine lines; about 
15 million train-kilometres per 
year 
 Contract duration: 16–22 years 
 Without contract management 
and management of incentive 
schemes 
 14 lines; about 19 million train-
kilometres per year 
 Contract duration: 2 years 
 Without transaction costs for  
target agreement contract 
 Contract management included in 
awarding procedure (high  
regularity) 
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
There seems to be a consensus that competition for the market results in higher transaction costs 
than direct awarding. However, the awarding procedure is neither the only nor the key driver 
of total transaction costs in RPT governance, especially when competition is narrowed to the 
production of RPT services, as in the German model. An analysis that goes beyond the contract 
awarding procedures and includes other transaction costs reveals a more comprehensive pic-
ture. In our comparison of Switzerland’s cooperative governance form and Germany’s compet-
itive governance form, we do not find evidence that the level of transaction costs of one gov-
ernance form is substantially higher than the other. What differs, however, is where and why 
transaction costs occur. This directly relates to institutions, actors, practices, and levels of trust 
among stakeholders that are inherent in the respective governance form. With regard to the 
drivers of transaction costs, the main difference between the two governance forms is the way 
PTAs make sure that TOCs produce satisfactory RPT services in terms of cost efficiency and 
quality. In the competitive governance form, PTAs channel their efforts into ensure a function-
ing bidding market. In the cooperative governance form, PTAs devote many resources to intro-
ducing multiple competition surrogates in order to overcome information asymmetries and le-
gitimise public funds devoted to RPT.  
Our results contribute to the ongoing debate about optimal governance forms for RPT. In 
particular, our insights permit an additional and different perspective when it comes to choosing 
between a competitive and a cooperative governance form. With a special focus on Switzer-
land’s rail RPT, we argue that transaction costs per se do not provide a convincing argument 
against an increased use of competitive instruments. In fact, the German governance form could 
serve as the role model for Switzerland if competition for the market is introduced there one 
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day as well. Service levels, service quality, and cost efficiency have risen without excessively 
increasing transaction costs. However, it would entail a radical change in culture for Swiss 
stakeholders, and responsibilities and risks would need to be clearly defined and reallocated to 
ensure a functioning bidding market and the provision of system services. PTAs must acquire 
the appropriate knowhow. Before the major railway reform in the mid-1990s, Switzerland’s 
TOCs were tightly bound to the public administration. Since the reform, they have bundled 
most of the relevant knowhow and often subtracted it from PTAs. Ultimately, Switzerland 
would have to accept that state-owned incumbents risk being driven out of the market if they 
lose a contract. This risk can be quite high because of the small size of Switzerland’s RPT 
market. Consequently, institutional reforms would take a long time and incur high one-time 
institutional transition costs.  
When assessing the introduction of a competitive governance form in Switzerland, we also 
must keep in mind the state of Germany’s RPT before its railway reform (section 3.1). Initial 
improvements in cost efficiency largely consisted of windfall gains. In Switzerland’s RPT, 
PTAs also introduced different instruments to enhance cost efficiency, such as the ordering 
principle and the compensation principle. Moreover, democratic pressure may serve as an ef-
fective competition surrogate. Therefore, cost efficiency gains like those observed in Germany 
are not a realistic scenario for Switzerland. Few studies have attempted to estimate cost ineffi-
ciency in Switzerland’s rail RPT. Arguably the most comprehensive study by Farsi et al. (2005) 
reveals average inefficiency estimates of approximately 6–8 percent of total yearly company 
costs (with maximum values of 31–38 percent). However, the panel the authors use only covers 
the period from 1985 to 1997, i.e., before the major railway reform. More recent estimates from 
Ecoplan (2008) using cross-sectional data show a much higher degree of inefficiency on the 
RPT line level. Both studies are limited by their benchmarking character, only showing relative 
efficiency compared to the best practice within the sample (Farsi et al., 2005).  
Germany has more than 20 years’ experience of competition in RPT. Today, PTAs tender 
out entire suburban railway networks. Switzerland can profit from these experiences, even if 
the current principal-agent relationship without competition for the market is maintained. Fewer 
but larger and more professional PTAs take responsibility for functionally defined market areas 
(decoupled from administrative borders), thereby realising economies of scale in awarding pro-
cedures, dissipating duplications, and ensuring that PTAs and TOCs meet on an equal footing. 
Additionally, giving TOCs and PTAs clearly defined responsibilities and longer contract peri-
ods with binding goals for TOCs will strengthen their commitment, planning reliability, and 
incentives to achieve cost efficiency. 
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In return, Germany could draw some lessons from the Swiss RPT case, provided there is 
compatibility with higher-level law.16 More flexible contract elements ease (joint) ex-post gov-
ernance, as well as advances with RPT and also foster mutual trust. One such contract element 
is the rollover of contracts if PTAs are satisfied with a TOC’s performance.  
Mainly owing to the methodology we use and the limited number of cases we consider, our 
study has some limitations. First, when compared to other cooperative governance forms, Swit-
zerland’s RPT governance has various peculiarities (e.g., short contract durations and a high 
level of mutual trust), possibly limiting the scope for generalisation. However, we believe that, 
although the drivers of transaction costs outlined in section 5.2 are partially specific to Switzer-
land’s RPT governance, they apply quite generally. Second, we concentrate on two countries 
only. A larger sample using other, distinctive case studies from other countries would allow 
further insights. In particular, a cooperative governance form with long contract periods would 
be a logical extension to our study. Third, as our quantitative results are based on rough esti-
mates, we cannot rule out inaccuracies. 
The limitations of our study could be a starting point for future research. One promising 
future research project is a more detailed quantitative analysis of the drivers of transaction costs, 
e.g., using Merkert's (2010) top-down approach. Besides, the question of how innovation and 
customer orientation (and related transaction costs) depend on the governance form has been 
raised only recently (Schaaffkamp, 2014). To date, this question remains vastly unanswered, 




We are most grateful to our interview partners and the experts who contributed to improving 
our results in various ways. In addition, we would like to thank the workshop participants at the 
14th Thredbo International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger 
Transport (August 2015, Santiago de Chile, Chile) for their inputs. We also wish to thank Thao 
Thi Vu of the Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts for her helpful inputs, as well 
as two anonymous reviewers for their highly valuable comments and suggestions, which im-
proved the manuscript. All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the authors.  
 
 
16 As non-EU member, Switzerland is not bound to EU legislation and thus has a greater degree of freedom 
in shaping the legal foundation of RPT. 
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Appendix to section 4 (Methodology) 
Our main research question is to identify the dimensions and drivers of transaction costs in 
cooperative versus competitive RPT governance forms. Because of the pronounced exploratory 
nature of the research question, we follow a qualitative research design. In particular, we use 
the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as have others 
in organizational research (Gross, 2013). Grounded theory is an iterative research process with 
various repeated steps, such as choosing case studies, gathering qualitative (and quantitative) 
data, and analysing and condensing the data. Accordingly, it relies greatly on empirical obser-
vations. Following the approach by Strauss and Corbin (1998), we explicitly include existing 
theoretical and empirical results as a basis for the subsequent field research.  
As a first step, we conduct an extensive literature review (on New Institutional Economics, 
Transaction Cost Economics, and public transport governance) and talk to industry experts from 
PTAs, TOCs, consulting and research companies, and politics (Table A 1). These interactions 
follow a narrative interview approach (Flick, 2012) and provide us with an initial idea of where 
transaction costs in RPT governance actually matter. Interviewees also provide us with sugges-
tions for suitable cases and contact data. Based on these initial interviews and the literature 
review, we develop a conceptual frame of reference in the form of a matrix. This matrix consists 
of dimensions of transaction costs and corresponding working hypotheses for how institutions, 
actors and their practices, and contexts affect transaction costs. The frame of reference is vali-
dated in additional interviews with experts from public transport consulting and research com-
panies (Table A 1).17 Finally, we use our frame of reference as basis for the interview guide in 
the case study interviews.18  
We select our contrasting cases based on theoretical sampling, i.e., according to their the-
oretical relevance for our research question. The main goal is to achieve qualitative represent-
ativeness to allow analytical generalisations (Yin, 2014). We apply the principles of “minimis-
ing differences” and “maximising differences” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 55ff). On the one hand, 
our cases are sufficiently comparable to allow the extraction of common features and patterns 
 
17 The experts we interviewed have extensive knowledge and experience of public transport in Germany and 
Switzerland. Besides formal interviews, we also acquire valuable information in more informal conversa-
tions, e.g., during breaks. 
18 If new insights emerge from the case study interviews (e.g., new questions or contradictions of previous 
findings), we adapt the interview guide accordingly (Flick, 2012). 
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(minimising differences).19 Based on these structural similarities between Germany’s and Swit-
zerland’s RPT governance, knowledge transfer and mutual learning is possible (Beck et al., 
2007; Finger et al., 2012; Kummer et al., 2013). On the other hand, RPT in Germany is organ-
ised competitively, with stakeholders now having vast experience of competitive tendering. In 
contrast, there has not yet been a competitive tender in Switzerland’s rail RPT (maximising 
differences). In summary, the chosen study design allows us to analyse the similarities and 
differences in terms of transaction costs between a cooperative and a competitive RPT govern-
ance form.  
Regarding cases within a single country, which therefore share the same institutional envi-
ronment, we ensure that they differ in theoretically important ways. First, we select both com-
plex suburban settings and less dense rural areas. Second, PTAs vary from rather small, less 
experienced PTAs with great dependence on the TOCs’ knowledge to powerful PTAs with vast 
responsibilities (e.g., for the provision of system services). Third, depending on the governance 
form, cases include as many peculiarities as possible in terms of the contract awarding proce-
dure, risk sharing, rolling stock provision, incentive contracts, contract duration, legal and op-
erational problems, and operator changes. 
For every case, we conduct interviews with the PTA and with at least one TOC. In the 
German cases, we also interview TOCs that were unsuccessful in a tender. We stop conducting 
interviews when no new insights emerge (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Despite using an interview 
guide, we leave the interviewees much space to talk freely, which gives the interviews a narra-
tive character (Flick, 2012). All interviews are recorded and transcribed. Moreover, we prepare 
a log of every interview with notes on important content, the interview setting, and informal 
statements (e.g., during breaks). In order to conclude the data-gathering process for the German 
cases, we interview two experts from the association of German PTAs to ensure that no major 
questions or topics remain unanswered (Table A 1).  
In the next stage, we analyse the data (transcripts, interview logs, additional documents) 
using qualitative content analysis.20 We code (conceptualise) the data as outlined in the 
 
19 Some examples of institutional similarities include the following. First, the political counties or regions are 
responsible for public transport in their areas. Second, long-distance, regional, and urban public transport are 
governed by separate bodies using different approaches. Third, the ordering principle and the compensation 
principle both apply. Fourth, the fully integrated state-owned incumbent TOC exerts a dominant role by 
operating the vast majority of RPT services. In addition, it operates long-distance railway services commer-
cially in a (legal or factual) monopoly position and is responsible for many system services, such as timeta-
bling or infrastructure management. Fifth, many small(er) state-owned TOCs operate in their regional niches. 
20 Additional documents consist of tender documents, newspaper articles, strategy papers, legal texts, and 
presentations. 
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grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).21 The procedure is as follows. First, we 
construct a coding scheme based on our frame of reference. Second, we code the data according 
to the coding scheme, but allow for new dimensions and concepts (open coding). The result is 
an extensive list of codes and memos.22 Third, we group similar codes into categories and sub-
categories and adapt our frame of reference accordingly. Categories and subcategories then are 
linked to new (axial) categories in order to acquire an understanding of patterns and relations 
among the (sub-)categories (axial coding). This step results in a preliminary list of the dimen-
sions and potential drivers of transaction costs for both governance forms. Finally, we condense 
the categories into the final dimensions and drivers of transaction costs through selective cod-
ing, whereby (sub-)categories are integrated into the key categories described in sections 5.1 
(dimensions of transaction costs) and 5.2 (drivers of transaction costs).  
As the last step, we validate our results. In qualitative research, this validation is of partic-
ular importance to ensure intersubjectivity since the results might be prone to subjective judge-
ment by the researchers, their pre-knowledge of theory and the research subject, their experi-
ence, social background, and values (Diekmann, 2007). Following the communicative valida-
tion approach (Flick, 2012), a workshop with a panel of RPT experts is set up. We first present 
our results and then discuss them in depth. The content of the discussion is condensed in a log 
and incorporated into the results of the study. Table A 1 gives additional information on the 
interviews and the participants in the expert panel. 
 
21 We used ATLAS.ti, a standard software for qualitative data analysis. 
22 We use memos to outline suggested relationships, relation to theory, new questions, and potential  
(sub-)categories of the dimensions and drivers of transaction costs. 
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Table A 1 Detailed information on the interviews and the expert panel. 
 Interviewee(s) Institution Role of institution /  
interviewee(s) 
Expert interviews  
 
Before case studies 
Duration: 1–4 
hours 
Thomas Neff SBB Deutschland 
GmbH 
Small TOC in Germany and 
Switzerland / CEO 
Peter Vollmer – Former Swiss politician and  
director of the TOC association 
Ernst Boos Thurbo Small Swiss TOC / CEO 
Wolf-Dieter Deuschle Public transport depart-
ment, Canton of Bern 




Infras, Zurich Leading Swiss consultancy for 
public transport governance / 
Senior consultants 
Christoph Schaaffkamp 
Lars Sturm  
Ingo Kühl 
KCW, Berlin Leading German consultancy 
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Senior managers 
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Benno Bucher SBB See above 
Christoph Schaaffkamp KCW, Berlin See above 
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Roland Wittwer FOT See above  
Samuel Wiedemann ZVV See above 
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In the governance of public transport, competitive tendering has often demonstrated good re-
sults in ensuring cost efficiency. However, to achieve other goals, such as a high level of ser-
vice quality, ridership growth, or building trusting partnerships between public transport op-
erators and public transport authorities (PTAs), cooperative governance instruments (such as 
negotiations) may be more suitable. One suggestion is to use competitive tendering only occa-
sionally but keep the threat to apply it whenever necessary, so that operators behave as if there 
were competition for the market. In addition, PTAs thereby can overcome information asym-
metries and establish effective benchmarking schemes. This paper empirically assesses indirect 
effects of competition for the market, including competitive tendering as a threat, on cost effi-
ciency. I use stochastic cost frontier analysis with a panel dataset of more than 850 regional 
bus lines in Switzerland from 2008 to 2017. Results show that inefficiency is lower for bus 
lines when some indirect effect of competitive tendering can be assumed. The findings indicate 
that a more flexible use of competitive tendering and its combination with other, cooperative 
governance instruments could support PTAs in pursuing cost efficiency, as well as setting 
additional goals in order to increase the overall welfare effect of public transport. 
 
 
† A version of this paper has been published as Wegelin, P. (2018). Is the mere threat enough? An empirical 
analysis about competitive tendering as a threat and cost efficiency in public bus transportation. Research in 
Transportation Economics 69, 245–253. This article is © Elsevier, whose permission has been granted for 




Recently, the debate over governance forms in public transport has been expanded with sug-
gestions to combine competitive instruments, such as competitive tendering, with cooperative 
instruments, namely negotiations. Competitive tendering has matured and often led to satisfac-
tory results, especially regarding cost efficiency.1 In particular, it is a very effective measure 
when performance is lagging, as is often the case in first-round tenders. However, tendering 
has “not been the panacea that might have been expected” (Veeneman & Smith, 2016: 63). If 
production is already cost efficient, cooperative governance instruments may be more appro-
priate. There are several examples of countries, including Switzerland and New Zealand, that 
only use competitive tendering selectively but still obtain satisfactory results regarding cost 
efficiency. In addition, governance instruments other than competitive tendering may be pre-
ferred to achieve goals such as improvements to service quality, ridership growth, innovation, 
and building long-term trusting partnerships between public transport authorities (PTAs) and 
operators (Wegelin & von Arx, 2016). In a hybrid governance form such as this, competitive 
tendering has another, indirect function: it may ensure cost efficiency not only when directly 
applied, but also when used as source of information for benchmarking and as threat when the 
PTA is not satisfied with the operators’ performance (Wallis et al., 2010). Consequently, 
Veeneman and Smith (2016) stress the need to focus research on design choices in tendering in 
order to improve it beyond of the cost efficiency effect alone and thereby making it a more 
effective instrument.  
To summarise, it is essential to improve understanding of the impact of different govern-
ance instruments on the performance of public transport operators. The ultimate goal of these 
reflections is to reap the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of both competitive and coop-
erative governance instruments in order to optimise public transport from an overall welfare 
perspective. Different approaches are proposed in the literature. The market can be tested ini-
tially using competitive tendering to overcome information asymmetries before moving on to 
negotiations and benchmarking at the efficient cost level (van de Velde & Beck, 2010). Another 
suggestion is to use competitive tendering only as a last resort when an operator’s performance 
is not satisfactory. Competitive tendering can therefore also serve as a threat (Alexandersson et 
al., 1998; Hensher & Stanley, 2008; Wallis et al., 2010). Operators, it is assumed, act as cost 
 
1 In this paper, efficiency means technical efficiency as opposed to other types of efficiency (Borger et al., 
2002; Kumbhakar et al., 2015). 
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efficient, i.e., as if there were real competition for the market. Establishing such a hybrid gov-
ernance form “can result in as good if not better outcomes than the automatic application of 
competitive tendering on all occasions” (Wallis et al., 2010: 96).  
The current paper brings to the forefront the indirect effects of competitive tendering, in-
cluding using competitive tendering as a threat. The first hypothesis states that the mere threat 
of putting a public transport service out to tender may be effective in ensuring cost efficiency, 
provided the threat is credible. The second hypothesis draws attention to a slightly different 
mechanism: operators with experience of competitive tendering may adopt cost efficient modes 
of production company-wide (i.e., for all the lines they operate). In addition, they reveal infor-
mation about cost efficient production to PTAs as basis for benchmarking. If the indirect effects 
work as supposed, PTAs will not be obliged to stick to just one governance instrument to ensure 
cost efficiency but can combine instruments more flexibly in order to pursue additional goals 
like service quality and customer orientation.  
To assess the indirect effects of competitive tendering on cost efficiency empirically, I 
apply stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) using panel data on more than 850 regional bus lines 
in Switzerland for 2008 to 2017. The panel nature of the data allows changes to the regulatory 
environment to be analysed (Dalen & Gómez-Lobo, 2003). Identification of the indirect effects 
of competitive tendering is based on variation in PTAs’ use of competitive tendering, direct 
awarding, and benchmarking within their respective areas of responsibility. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section summarises the rele-
vant literature. Section 3 describes Switzerland’s regional public bus transport. Section 4 pre-
sents the methodology and data used. Results are summarised in section 5, followed by a dis-
cussion and conclusion to the paper in section 6. 
 
2. Literature review 
The existing body of literature on contestable markets, threat-based regulation, and public 
transport governance provides a valuable basis for the examination of the indirect effects of 
competition on cost efficiency. This section provides a summary of the relevant literature. 
 
2.1 Competitive tendering as a threat 
The term “potential competition” relates to Baumol’s theory of contestable markets where a 
credible entry threat disciplines the incumbent monopolist (Baumol, 1982: 2). Credibility is 
ensured by sufficiently low entry barriers. In the transportation sector, e.g., studies have been 
made of the contestability of airline markets (Hurdle et al., 1989) and of markets for commercial 
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coach services (Gwilliam, 1989). The latter study extends the contestability to competition for 
the market and suggests that “competitive tendering is the most powerful and credible threat to 
incumbents” (p. 41). In non-profitable markets like the regional public bus market in Switzer-
land, no entry will occur naturally, no matter how low entry barriers may be. The regulator can 
then take over the role of a potential entrant and artificially establish a contestable market by 
threatening to intervene. This line of argument often appears in the antitrust context (Acutt & 
Elliott, 2001). E.g., Glazer and McMillan (1992) mention a case of highway construction costs 
falling in a US state after corresponding antitrust measures had been introduced in the neigh-
bouring states. It is thus the fear of regulation that alters firms’ behaviour, even if regulation 
does not occur. Threat-based regulation, however, only works if the regulator has built up a 
credible reputation for intervention. If the threat of regulation is effective, actual regulation does 
not have any (additional) effect. In contrast, if the threat is not credible, incumbents do not have 
to fear sanctions (Hensher et al., 2007). According to Acutt and Elliott (2001), to be credible 
regulators must be able to detect, e.g., abuses of market power. For this they must have adequate 
legal powers at their disposal, sufficient knowhow, and a reputation for intervening when nec-
essary. Consequently, expected punishment for incumbent firms must be sufficiently large. 
How can this credibility be ensured in the present context? 
Hensher and Stanley (2008) stress the need to continuously test the market to ensure the 
credibility of tendering as a fallback option and to gather information for benchmarking. For 
PTAs, regular market testing may also be necessary in order to keep the market alive. Albalate 
et al. (2010) assume that the threat to award services competitively enhances the PTA’s bar-
gaining power and thereby has a disciplining effect on costs when several bus-operating com-
panies (BOCs) are in the market. A similar argument is put forward by Boitani and Cambini 
(2006), who find that cost reductions after competitive tendering are often negligible when there 
are no or only a few bidders besides the incumbent. 
Figure 1 provides a simple conceptual model of the conditions for achieving credibility 
when competitive tendering is used as a threat. First, PTAs must be empowered and able to run 
a tendering procedure, i.e., they have the corresponding legal powers, the necessary knowhow, 
experience, resources, and a sufficient reputation. This includes that PTAs, in their role as mar-
ket makers, must be capable of ensuring a level playing field during the bidding procedure 
(Wegelin & von Arx, 2016). Second, a certain number of capable bidders with sufficient re-
sources, competences, and experience must be in the market and potentially ready to take part 
in a given tender. If these conditions are met, a PTA’s threat to tender out a service is credible. 





Figure 1 Simple conceptual model of the conditions for credibility of competitive tendering as a threat in public 
transport.  
 
Several studies mention the possible effect of the threat of competitive tendering in public 
transport. Hensher and Houghton (2004) assert that the threat of competition alone, among other 
things, has the potential to deliver substantial cost savings. According to Alexandersson et al. 
(1998: 209), “[t]he threat of future tendering may encourage … operators to increase produc-
tivity in order to be competitive when tendering occurs”. In addition, operators with a directly 
awarded contract could copy new and better production methods from operators that have been 
exposed to tendering. Wallis et al. (2010: 96) note that the credible threat of competition will 
secure at least some of the cost efficiency gains that may be achieved by using competitive 
tendering directly. They add that “[p]rocurement through negotiation alone, without such a 
threat, will rarely achieve the potential gains in efficiency and effectiveness achievable with 
competitive tendering”. Veeneman et al. (2014: 107) conclude from interviews with public 
transport stakeholders that cost efficiency of untendered concessions was driven up because 
“the authorities did use the threat to tender”. Filippini et al. (2015) cite the disciplining effect 
of a threat to tender as a reason why they do not find any direct effect of competitive tendering 
on cost efficiency. 
 
2.2 Cost efficiency and contractual regimes in public bus transport 
Numerous empirical studies have examined the variation in unit cost and cost efficiency in 
public bus transport, partially by treating governance instruments and contractual regimes as 
explanatory factors. Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (2003) show for a panel of Norwegian bus services 
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that yardstick competition lowers cost inefficiency compared to other, less incentivised con-
tracts. Highly incentivised contracts also lead to less deviation from minimum costs in a panel 
of Italian BOCs (Piacenza, 2006), as well as in French urban bus transport (Roy & Yvrande-
Billon, 2007). Contracting-out local bus services has shown inefficiency-reducing effects in 
Japan (Sakai & Takahashi, 2013) and Sweden (Vigren, 2016). Conversely, Veeneman et al. 
(2014) do not find that competitive tendering had a significant effect on cost efficiency in a 
small panel of public bus transport contracts in the Netherlands. Unit cost or aggregate cost 
savings (as compared to increased cost efficiency) after competitive tendering are reported by, 
e.g., Bekken et al. (2006) for Norwegian BOCs, Beck (2011) for case studies of public bus 
transport in Germany, and Alexandersson et al. (1998) for bus provision in Swedish counties. 
The latter study includes a brief examination of the effect of competitive tendering as a threat, 
without finding evidence. Finally, Hensher and Wallis (2005) summarise various results in a 
review paper, reporting mixed effects.  
In the case of Switzerland’s public transport, studies of cost efficiency usually do not con-
sider governance instruments and contractual regimes (e.g., Cullmann et al., 2012; Ecoplan, 
2008; Farsi et al., 2005; Farsi et al., 2006). To date, the paper by Filippini et al. (2015) is the 
only study that includes contractual regimes in order to explain variation in cost efficiency. 
They analyse a cross-section of the lines served by the biggest BOC (Postbus) only. As men-
tioned above, they do not find a difference in cost efficiency levels between directly awarded 
and competitively tendered contracts. Besides, some Swiss PTAs anecdotally report substantial 
unit cost reductions in first-round tenders (Amt für öffentlichen Verkehr des Kantons Bern 
AöV, 2011). 
In summary, the review of the existing literature in sections 2.1 and 2.2 indicates that the 
indirect effects of competitive tendering can be suitable instruments in public transport govern-
ance. The current paper adds to this literature by empirically identifying the indirect cost effi-
ciency effects of competitive tendering in public bus transport. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, only Alexandersson et al. (1998) investigate an indirect effect of competitive ten-
dering empirically, but then only marginally. In addition, their data are on the county level and 
they do not examine cost efficiency but aggregate costs. 
 
3. Switzerland’s regional public bus transport system 
Switzerland’s regional public transport is characterized by a particularly high level of system 
integration, with frequent services, synchronized timetables, comprehensive fare integration, 
high punctuality values, and trusting partnerships between PTAs and BOCs. This good quality, 
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however, comes at a high cost for Swiss taxpayers, who subsidise regional public transport by 
approximately CHF 1.9 bn per year, of which about a third (CHF 0.6 to 0.7 bn) is dedicated to 
bus transport.2 Average cost recovery in Switzerland’s regional public transport (including rail 
and buses) amounts to approximately 50 percent and has remained rather constant in recent 
years (Federal Office of Transport FOT, 2015; Ecoplan, 2014).3 Funding occurs jointly and on 
average is shared equally by the 26 cantonal PTAs and the Federal Office of Transport (FOT). 
Biennial bus line contracts are usually awarded directly to incumbent BOCs. Cantonal PTAs 
take the lead in the awarding procedure but are supported by the FOT, which is responsible for 
nationwide coordination, standardisation, and benchmarking. Benchmarking is used to evaluate 
BOCs’ bids and embraces some key performance indicators (KPI) of costs, revenues, and sub-
sidies. In addition, several PTAs have developed sophisticated benchmarking schemes of their 
own that use a model-based approach similar to that in this paper. With the exception of the 
Zürcher Verkehrsverbund ZVV (Zurich transport authority), contracts are net-cost, i.e., BOCs 
collect ticketing revenues and are reimbursed the difference between expected revenues and 
expected costs. As extensions to the ordinary contract, target agreement contracts can be nego-
tiated to stipulate goals for, e.g., cost efficiency, revenue, and service quality over longer time 
periods. PTAs were given the option of using competitive tendering in a legislative amendment 
in 1996. Since another reform in 2012, competitive tendering has become mandatory in certain 
circumstances, usually after the long-term transport licences have expired. However, PTAs still 
face leeway due to the law’s exception clauses. To date, only some PTAs have used competitive 
tendering and sophisticated benchmarking. In the following, this variation among PTAs is used 
to identify the indirect effects of competitive tendering on cost efficiency.  
 
4. Methodology 
To assess the influence of regulation on cost efficiency, a model of technical efficiency is spec-
ified. Like many before (e.g., Dalen & Gómez-Lobo, 2003; Filippini et al., 2015; Piacenza, 
2006; Sakai & Takahashi, 2013; Veeneman et al., 2014; Vigren, 2016), I estimate a cost func-
tion, assuming that BOCs minimise costs. In the Swiss case, output—essentially networks and 
schedules—is entirely predetermined by the PTAs, making a cost function seem appropriate 
(Farsi et al., 2006). As a functional form, a Cobb-Douglas cost function is chosen (Battese & 
 
2 Using average exchange rates for 2017 (Swiss National Bank, 2018), these numbers amount to roughly the 
identical value in US dollars and to 1.7 bn (0.54 to 0.63 bn for bus transport) in Euros. 
3 In bus transport, cost recovery is slightly higher than 50 percent for buses operated in agglomerations and 
around 35 percent for buses operated in rural areas (Ecoplan, 2014). These figures have been fairly stable 
over the last few years. 
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Coelli, 1995; Farsi et al., 2005). Sometimes, the more flexible translog function is preferred 
because it does not impose the Cobb-Douglas restrictions, such as an elasticity of substitution 
between inputs of one (Filippini et al., 2015). In this paper, the translog function serves as a 
robustness check for the results obtained using the Cobb-Douglas specification.  
Estimation of coefficients is implemented by applying stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
as originally proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Jondrow et al. (1982). I formulate a stochastic 
cost frontier model for panel data (Battese & Coelli, 1995).4 For each regional bus line, a cost 
function and a cost inefficiency function are estimated simultaneously. This procedure is com-
mon and preferred to a two-stage approach (Dalen & Gómez-Lobo, 2003). The stochastic cost 
frontier model is generally specified as follows: 
 𝐶 𝑓 𝑌 ,𝑊 ,𝑍 ,𝐺 ,𝑇 ∙ exp 𝑣 𝑢  .  (1) 
 𝐶  are the costs for unit 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑌  is an output vector, 𝑊  is an input price vector, 𝑍  
contains a set of environmental variables, 𝐺  is a vector of governance variables and T repre-
sents a linear time trend (neutral technology factor). The composite error term is 𝜀 𝑣 𝑢 . 𝑣  is a random noise term reflecting random shocks, whereas 𝑢  is the ineffi-
ciency term, representing the variance in costs that is not explained by the cost function (which 
includes the environmental variables 𝑍 ) and random noise 𝑣 . To separate random noise from 
inefficiency, distributional assumptions on the two error terms are necessary. The random noise 
term 𝑣  is usually assumed to be 𝑁 0,𝜎  and to be independent of all regressors in the cost 
function and the inefficiency function respectively. 𝑢  is assumed to be non-negative and typ-
ically distributed half normal 𝑁 0,𝜎  or truncated normal 𝑁 𝜇 ,𝜎 𝐼 𝑢 0 . If 𝑢 0, 
production occurs at a cost efficient level. The mean of the inefficiency term is specified as a 
function of governance variables: 𝜇 𝑔 𝐺 . These governance variables are assumed not to 
influence production technology directly but rather managerial behaviour. Thus, they enter the 
inefficiency function and not the cost function (Dalen & Gómez-Lobo, 2003). Based on Coelli 
et al. (1999), efficiency scores from the cost function relate to gross-efficiencies that are not yet 
‘corrected’ by governance influences. Net-efficiency, on the other hand, considers governance 
variables and thus primarily represents managerial performance and skills. 
 
 
4 Besides making it possible to study changes in the regulatory environment, using panel data allows one to 
control for line-specific unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity that may influence cost efficiency or that 
may be correlated with explanatory variables (Farsi et al., 2006). 
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4.1 Empirical model 
The Cobb-Douglas stochastic cost frontier function is implemented by equation (2). It is line-
arized by taking logs to reduce issues of heteroscedasticity in error terms and to ease computa-
tion. The linear homogeneity assumption of the Cobb-Douglas cost function is realised by di-
viding cost and price variables by the price of labour 𝑊 .5 
 
ln
𝐶𝑊 𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑄 𝛽 𝑙𝑛 𝑊𝑊 𝛽 𝑍 𝛽 𝑇 𝑣  𝑢  .  (2) 
 𝐶  are the total operational costs of line 𝑖 in year 𝑡 and 𝑄  denotes output measured in 
seat-kilometres.6 I use a supply-related output variable because supply is entirely determined 
by the PTA.7 Demand is controlled for with the load factor. 𝑊  is the price of labour per hour, 
calculated by dividing line-specific yearly staffing costs by productive hours.8 𝑊  is the price 
of all non-labour factors—mainly capital and energy—divided by bus-kilometres, as proposed 
by Farsi et al. (2006) and Filippini et al. (2015). The vector of environmental variables 𝑍  
captures heterogeneity and potentially different operating conditions among bus lines. Table 1 
provides an overview of the environmental variables. 
 
Table 1 Description of the environmental variables in 𝑍 . 
Variable Description / Rationale 
Average travelling speed Captures local conditions, such as congestion, number of stops, area density, and 
geographical or topographical characteristics. 
Load factor Passenger-kilometres per seat-kilometre. Represents demand conditions. 
Supply category Dummy variables for the supply categories “rural”, “agglomeration”, “mixed ru-
ral-agglomeration”, and “mixed rural-touristic”. Partially touristic lines receive 
less compensation payments. 
Postbus Dummy variable for Postbus, by far the biggest BOC in Switzerland.  
 𝛽  are the parameters to be estimated. They can be interpreted as either elasticities or semi- 
elasticities, depending on whether the corresponding variables are specified in logs or levels.  
 
5 Another important property of a microeconomic cost function is concavity in input prices. In the case of 
Cobb-Douglas, this property is automatically fulfilled. 
6 All cost and price variables are measured in 2017 Swiss Francs (January), using Switzerland’s official 
consumer price index (Federal Statistical Office FOS, 2017). 
7 For a discussion of the use of supply- or demand side-variables, see, e.g., Borger et al. (2002), Filippini et 
al. (2015), and Vigren (2016). 
8 Productive hours include all hours the bus is available for passengers (including turnover time). 
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The inefficiency term 𝑢  is assumed to be truncated normally distributed  𝑁 𝜇 ,𝜎 𝐼 𝑢 0 . Mean cost inefficiency is allowed to vary depending on exogenous ex-
planatory factors and is modelled as follows: 
 
E 𝑢 |𝜀 𝜇 𝜃 𝐺  .  (3) 
 𝐺  includes governance variables, and 𝜃 is the parameter vector to be estimated. The im-
portance of inefficiency relative to random noise and relative to the total variance of the com-
posite error term is measured by 𝜆 𝜎 𝜎⁄  and 𝛾 𝜎 𝜎 𝜎⁄  respectively. 
The parameters of equations (2) and (3) are estimated simultaneously with maximum like-
lihood. Inefficiency per bus line is determined by equation (4) using the approach by Jondrow 
et al. (1982), in which 𝑢 -related deviations from the cost frontier are interpreted as ineffi-
ciency: 
 𝐶𝐸 ln𝐶
ln𝐶 exp E 𝜇 |𝜀  .  (4) 
 
Values closer to one are interpreted as lower inefficiency. Different specifications of the 
cost inefficiency function are tested, using the variables defined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Description of governance variables in 𝐺 . 
Variable Description / Rationale 
Tendering variables 
Tendering dummy If a line was competitively tendered. 
Tendering PTA dummy If a PTA has competitively tendered any line within its responsibility 
area. This variable is a proxy for the tendering experience of PTAs. 
Tendering BOC dummy If at least one line operated by a BOC has been competitively tendered. 
This variable represents the tendering experience of BOCs. 
Benchmarking 
Benchmarking dummy If a PTA uses sophisticated benchmarking. 
 
The identification strategy is based on operationalisation of the indirect effects of compet-
itive tendering. First, I assume there is a credible threat of competitive tendering if a PTA oc-
casionally tenders out bus services. In doing so, a PTA signals its willingness and ability to use 
this instrument. In addition, there are 69 BOCs in regional public bus transport in Switzerland 
in 2017. Postbus is the dominant player. In some regions, however, other BOCs also have sig-
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nificant market shares and thus can be treated as serious bidders. I therefore assume that a suf-
ficient number of capable bidders are present in the market.9 Second, if a PTA uses sophisti-
cated benchmarking, it can compare the cost inefficiency of bus lines in its area of responsibility 
to cost efficient lines that have been put out to tender, thus reducing information asymmetry. 
Third, BOCs that have tendering experience may become more cost efficient in the operation 
of non-tendered lines as well. One reason is that they adopt efficient ways of production to all 
services. Another potential mechanism is that PTAs benchmark the lines of a given BOC.  
Unbiased estimation of the effect of governance variables on cost efficiency requires the 
usual exogeneity assumption to be fulfilled. If a PTA’s choice of a particular governance in-
strument depends on unobserved factors such as its perception of the BOC’s inefficiency, the 
coefficients would be biased (Dalen & Gómez-Lobo, 2003). The exogeneity assumption can be 
tested using pre-tender data (Lalive & Schmutzler, 2011). Descriptive analysis reveals that ten-
dered lines differ significantly from non-tendered lines in some of the observable variables that 
are controlled for in the models. For instance, tendered lines are characterised by fewer passen-
gers, fewer seat-kilometres, and higher load factors. Quite small lines are apparently put out to 
tender, a procedure often observed when competitive tendering is introduced to a market 
(Wegelin & von Arx, 2016). However, the estimated cost efficiency scores of tendered and non-
tendered lines in the pre-tender stage are similar.10 This indicates that PTAs’ selection of lines 
to put out to tender should not be endogenous if controlled for observables. The same argument 




The unbalanced panel of Swiss regional public bus transport lines includes data on planned 
costs, supply, revenues, and subsidies on a yearly basis from 2008 to 2017. Only ordinary bus 
lines that fall under the laws governing Swiss public transport are considered. School buses, 
night buses, purely tourist buses, ski-buses, dial-a-bus lines, extra trip lines, and replacement 
buses for temporarily closed railway lines are excluded from the sample. After eliminating ob-
servations with missing values, the dataset embraces a total of 8,993 observations. Summary 
statistics are given in Table 3.  
 
9 Experience shows that several bidders participated in all the previous competitive tenders (Amt für 
öffentlichen Verkehr des Kantons Bern AöV, 2011; FOT, 2017). 




Table 3 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation. 
Variable Mean Standard  
deviation 
Cost function variables   
Total costs 𝐶  (2017 Swiss francs) 1,033,893 1,027,906 
Million seat-km 𝑄  14.82 17.05 
Price of labour 𝑊  (2017 Swiss francs per hour) 59.68 12.09 
Price of other inputs 𝑊  (2017 Swiss francs per bus-km) 3.64 1.26 
Load factor (passenger-km per seat-km) 0.1 0.06 
Geographical areas: rural (80%); agglomeration (6%); mixed (6%); rural mixed 
with tourist bus (8%) 
  
Average travelling speed in km/h 20.94 6.02 
Contractual variables   
Total lines tendered: before 2008 (76); 2008 – 2017 (20)   
Proportion of tendered lines on total lines (tendering dummy) 0.1 0.3 
Total number of PTAs with tendering experience 14 (54%)  
Proportion of lines awarded by a PTA with tendering experiencea (tendering PTA 
dummy) 
0.72 0.44 
Total number of PTAs using sophisticated benchmarking 6 (23%)  
Proportion of lines awarded by a PTA using sophisticated benchmarking  
(benchmarking dummy) 
0.27 0.44 
Proportion of lines operated by a BOC with tendering experience (tendering BOC 
dummy) 
0.73 0.45 
Total number of BOCs with tendering experience (won or lost) 19 (27%)  
Number of observations: N = 8,993   
a The assignment of bus lines to PTAs was somehow challenging because the data are not separated by PTAs’ 
areas of responsibility. Numerous lines cross cantonal boarders and are ordered by more than one PTA, 
whereas the PTA with the highest share of the line’s length usually takes the lead. I used GIS tools and offi-
cial charts to assign lines to PTAs. Single errors cannot be ruled out. 
 
Ten percent of all regional bus lines in the sample were put out to tender, and no second 
tendering rounds occurred before the end of the observation period. As the regional bus market 
is dominated by Postbus, which has experience of competitive tendering, 73 percent of all lines 
are operated by a BOC that took part in a competitive tender, regardless of whether it succeeded 
or not. 72 percent of all lines fall within the area of responsibility of a PTA with experience of 
competitive tendering. This is driven by the fact that one of the largest PTAs is that which uses 
competitive tendering most frequently. Finally, 27 percent of all lines in the sample have been 
awarded based on sophisticated benchmarking.  
 
5. Results 
To examine the indirect effects of competitive tendering, three models are estimated that differ 
regarding the specification of the inefficiency function. Model I uses only one dummy variable 
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that indicates if a line was tendered out. In model II, another two dummy variables are added, 
the first considering sophisticated benchmarking applied by some PTAs, the second represent-
ing PTAs’ tendering experience. Model III also captures BOCs’ tendering experience. Estima-
tion results are shown in Table 4. 
 
5.1 Cost function 
The estimated coefficients of the cost function show the expected signs and size. All models 
show economies of density of around 1.4, i.e., an increase in output measured by seat-kilome-
tres does not lead to a proportional increase in costs, a result also found by Filippini et al. (2015) 
and Farsi et al. (2006) for Swiss BOCs.11 The coefficient of the input price ratio shows the 
proportion of total costs attributable to input factors other than labour. Consequently, labour’s 
share is around 65 percent, comparable to results in previous studies. A higher load factor in-
creases costs. At first glance, this contradicts the findings of Filippini et al. (2015). However, 
they use passenger-kilometres as the output variable, in which case a higher load factor lowers 
costs because it reflects the use of smaller and less expensive vehicles, especially in rural areas 
where demand is often low. In contrast, I use a supply-related output variable. The load factor 
thus directly measures the cost-enhancing effects of high demand (e.g., cleaning costs or oper-
ational asset depreciation). Higher average travelling speeds go along with lower costs since 
they assume fewer stops and less intensive use of the vehicle. Bus lines in rural areas are more 
costly to run than those in other geographical areas. One reason for this result could be an 
inefficient and inflexible use of inputs due to low service frequencies. Finally, the estimation 
results show higher costs for Postbus. This might be explained with reference to the complexity 
costs of large organizations. 
 
5.2 Inefficiency function 
In all three models, governance variables affect cost inefficiency in a negative way. Direct ex-
posure to competitive tendering significantly lowers inefficiency in models I and II. In model 
III, this effect is not statistically significant.  
 
11 Economies of density are given by (Farsi et al., 2006). I cannot compute economies of scale because 
there are no data available on the length of the network served by a BOC. 
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Table 4 Estimation results of the stochastic cost frontier models. 
 Model I  Model II  Model II 
 Coefficient z-value  Coefficient z-value  Coefficient z-value 
Cost function12         
Seat-km 𝑄  0.717*** 209.24  0.715*** 212.35  0.711*** 212.31 
Input price ratio 𝑊 𝑊⁄  0.343*** 32.91  0.346*** 32.35  0.353*** 34.00 
Load factor 2.994*** 47.53  3.030*** 48.63  3.117*** 48.64 
Average travelling 
speed 
-0.020*** -32.42  -0.019*** -32.28  -0.019*** -31.36 
Postbus (dummy) 0.037*** 5.89  0.034*** 5.49  0.149*** 3.54 
Agglomeration 
(dummy) 
-0.096*** -7.19  -0.094*** -7.08  -0.093*** -6.96 
Agglomeration-rural 
(dummy) 
-0.065*** -5.32  -0.067*** -5.47  -0.066*** -5.46 
Rural-touristic 
(dummy) 
-0.034*** -2.99  -0.037*** -3.23  -0.039*** -3.47 
Constant -10.605*** -152.44  -10.548*** -159.51  -10.472*** -162.33 
Inefficiency function         
Competitive tendering 
(dummy) 
-0.097*** -2.80  -0.077** -2.03  -0.054 -1.23 
Benchmarking 
(dummy) 
   -0.095*** -2.82  -0.110*** -2.91 
PTA tendering  
experience (dummy) 
   -0.047** -2.31  -0.014 -0.57 
BOC tendering  
experience (dummy) 
      -0.135*** -2.9 𝜎  0.164*** 6.85  0.196*** 10.90  0.242*** 13.93 𝜎  0.247*** 42.18  0.241*** 49.30  0.233*** 55.38 𝜆 0.662*** 22.53  0.811*** 36.21  1.035*** 49.85 𝛾 0.305   0.397   0.517  
Log-likelihood -828.35   -818.21   -806.60  
Number of observations: N = 8,993       
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
 
In model II, PTA tendering experience has a negative effect on inefficiency. PTAs that 
have put regional bus lines out to tender seem to demonstrate their ability and willingness to 
use this instrument, thereby exerting a disciplining effect on cost inefficiency, even if there is 
no actual tender for a given line.13 The sophisticated benchmarking schemes adopted by some 
PTAs significantly lower inefficiency in all models and indicate the potential of the yardstick 
 
12 To ensure convergence of the estimation, the dependent variable was normalised (mean = 1). However, 
where estimation was possible without normalization, results were identical. 
13 Since only a dummy variable is used, no further conclusion on the credibility and intensity of this threat 
can be drawn. Therefore, I test different specifications, e.g., using the proportion of tendered lines of all the 
lines within a PTA’s area of responsibility area or requiring a minimum of two competitive tenders for a PTA 
to be considered as having tendering experience. The sign of the corresponding coefficient remains un-
changed, whereas it is statistically significant only in the latter case. 
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competition kind of regulation. These benchmarking schemes profit from information revealed 
by bidders in actual tenders or—likewise—when competitive tendering as a threat effectively 
works. 
In model III, BOCs’ exposure to competitive tendering, whether as the incumbent or as the 
winning bidder, has a negative sign and is statistically significant. In other words, if a BOC has 
experienced competitive tendering, inefficiency is lower for all lines served by this BOC, in-
cluding lines for which contracts are awarded directly. This effect may be attributed to BOCs’ 
adoption of cost efficient modes of production and to benchmarking by PTAs. By including 
BOCs’ tendering experience in the inefficiency function, the coefficients of the tendering 
dummy and the PTAs’ tendering experience become smaller and insignificant. Hence, the in-
dividual results of the previous specifications (models I and II) do not seem totally robust.  
In summary, cost efficiency-enhancing effects of indirect competition are identified, the 
main mechanisms being BOCs’ tendering experience and the use of sophisticated benchmark-
ing. The results regarding PTAs’ tendering experience and thus the threat of competitive ten-
dering are less conclusive. Finally, in all models the estimates of 𝜆 and 𝛾 indicate that ineffi-
ciency matters when compared to noise. 
To examine the effect of PTA and BOC tendering experience and benchmarking on cost 
efficiency further, I estimate three additional models restricted to the subset of bus lines that 
have so far never been put out to tender. Table 5 shows that the above results can be confirmed.  
 
Table 5 Inefficiency function estimates using the restricted sample without tendered bus lines. 
 Model IV  Model V  Model VI 
 Coefficient z-value  Coefficient z-value  Coefficient z-value 
Inefficiency function         
Benchmarking (dummy) -0.06* -1.67  -0.087** -2.32  -0.084** -2.17 
PTA tendering experience 
(dummy) 
-0.047** -2.26     -0.012 -0.47 
BOC tendering experience 
(dummy) 
   -0.135*** -3.16  -0.125** -2.5 
Number of observations: N = 8,125 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
 
Cost efficiency scores (net-efficiencies) per line and year are calculated in Table 6.14 In 
general, cost efficiency levels are high and comparable to the findings of Filippini et al. (2015). 
Efficiencies are highest in model I (mean of 0.905), where inefficiency is only altered by direct 
 
14 Cost efficiency scores across all models are highly correlated with Spearman correlation coefficients above 
0.95. 
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exposure to competitive tendering. In models II and III, the additional indirect effects of com-
petitive tendering lead to lower mean efficiencies (0.876 for model II and 0.864 for model III). 
The reason for this drop in the efficiency scores is that in model I, the additional governance 
variables representing the indirect effects of competitive tendering enter the composite error 
term 𝜀 𝑣 𝑢  only partially as inefficiency 𝑢  (and partially as random noise 𝑣 ). In-
stead, in models II and III, these variables directly explain the variation in the inefficiency term 𝑢 . Cost efficiency scores can be compared between different groups of bus lines. For instance, 
efficiency scores for lines where the PTA uses sophisticated benchmarking and the BOC has 
tendering experience are significantly higher than for lines where neither applies.15 
 
Table 6 Summary of cost efficiency scores estimated for the three models. 
 Model I  Model II  Model III 
Mean  0.905  0.876  0.864 
Median  0.908  0.882  0.875 
Maximum 0.974  0.972  0.973 
Minimum 0.598  0.495  0.38 
 
5.3 Robustness 
To validate the estimation results, I perform additional robustness checks. First, the influence 
of two particular PTAs is analysed. For this purpose, all models are estimated for subsamples 
i) without the PTA that uses competitive tendering most frequently and ii) without the PTA 
ZVV, which operates under distinct terms.16 The results do not change in a meaningful way, 
and the effect of PTAs’ tendering experience becomes even stronger under i). Second, different 
variable sets in the cost function (e.g., regarding the variable measuring BOCs’ output) and the 
inefficiency function (e.g., regarding how to measure tendering experience) are tested, without 
changing the results. Third, to check conformity with the study by Filippini et al. (2015), a 
cross-sectional SFA is estimated for the 2009 subsample of all Postbus lines. The results are 
comparable in the sense that competitive tendering has no direct effect on cost efficiency. How-
ever, PTAs’ tendering experience enters the inefficiency function with a statistically significant 
negative coefficient. This indicates that cost efficiency generally is higher where PTAs have 
partially used competitive tendering. Fourth, using data containing figures for realised costs 
 
15 These tests are conducted using the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-population method (Kruskal & Wallis, 
1952). 
16 The ZVV is set up somewhat differently than the other PTAs. Although it is a PTA, it also represents all 
BOCs within its area of responsibility vis-à-vis the FOT. It defines so-called market leader companies that 
are responsible for bus services in certain areas. In addition, gross-cost contracts are used. 
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reported by BOCs after the contract period (rather than planned costs) does not alter the esti-
mation results except that the effect of PTAs’ tendering experience becomes slightly larger and 
statistically significant in any model. Fifth, I specify a translog cost function instead of the more 
restrictive Cobb-Douglas cost function. Inefficiency function coefficients in the translog spec-
ification are slightly larger and statistically significant for all four governance variables in all 
models.  
In summary, the robustness checks indicate that the results are quite robust to different 
specifications. Moreover, the reported results seem rather conservative, since two major robust-
ness checks (specifying a translog cost function and using data on realised costs) lead to 
stronger and significant effects of all governance variables.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
PTAs have a vital interest in the cost efficient provision of the public transport services they 
procure. From an overall welfare perspective, the results of competitive tendering have been 
mixed. Besides, some countries have demonstrated that satisfying results can also be achieved 
by relying on cooperative instruments. This challenges the primacy of competition and calls for 
the further optimisation of governance forms. One proposed way forward is to pursue a hybrid 
approach. The mechanical obligation to use competitive tendering is suspended, and coopera-
tive instruments are promoted. To ensure that operators still produce cost efficiently, competi-
tive tendering remains an essential instrument both as a fallback option and as a vehicle to test 
the market for subsequent benchmarking. A credible threat of competitive tendering can be 
established by competent and experienced PTAs that occasionally apply this instrument, thus 
demonstrating both capability and willingness, and keeping the bidder market alive. As a con-
sequence, the advantages of both competitive and cooperative governance forms can be reaped 
in favour of public transport in general.  
The present study assesses the indirect effects of competitive tendering on cost efficiency 
empirically, using the example of regional public bus transport in Switzerland. The findings 
indicate the existence of such effects. The main mechanisms are BOCs’ previous exposure to 
competitive tendering and sophisticated benchmarking that partially relies on competitively 
tendered bus lines. Politicians, regulators, and PTAs can take this result into account when (re-
)designing public transport governance. In Switzerland, this means that competitive tendering 
could be used more broadly, at least at the outset, to test the market and allow the stakeholders 
to gain experience. Subsequently, other governance instruments, such as comprehensive target 
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agreement contracts, become even more valuable because cost efficiency is ensured. In addi-
tion, nationwide benchmarking could be strengthened by adopting a sophisticated benchmark-
ing scheme similar to that already established by certain PTAs. 
If the indirect effects of competitive tendering are useful as a means to foster cost effi-
ciency, different questions for practice and future research arise. What skills and resources do 
PTAs need in order to exert a credible threat of competitive tendering and to meet operators on 
an equal footing? How do PTAs optimally design the proposed hybrid governance form, and in 
particular what criteria are useful in deciding whether a service is put out to tender? How reg-
ularly should tendering be applied to keep the bidder market alive? What is the optimal design 
of cooperative governance instruments in a hybrid governance form? How do operators adapt 
their behaviour and strategy in such a regime, and what are the transaction costs? What are the 
overall welfare effects, including innovation, customer orientation, and ridership growth? 
To conclude this article, I will point out four limitations of this study. First, despite the 
extensive database, only 20 bus lines were put out to tender during the panel period. This limits 
the ability to identify empirically the direct and indirect effects of competitive tendering. In the 
near future, the market will become more dynamic: by 2018, a couple of recently tendered lines 
will start operating. In addition, several first-round tenders in different PTA areas of responsi-
bility are officially being planned for the near future. The present study is therefore preliminary 
in nature and should be repeated and extended when more data become available. Second, het-
eroscedasticity in the composite error term could lead to inconsistent estimates (Belotti et al., 
2013; Kumbhakar et al., 2015). I reduce the severity of potential heteroscedasticity by partially 
logarithmising and standardising the variables used in the models. A third potential caveat is 
the endogeneity of regressors, especially the decision to put a bus line out to tender in the first 
place (but see the additional tests in section 4.1 on this potential issue). Fourth, the indirect 
effects of competitive tendering are measured using simple dummy variables. Even though 
some robustness checks are performed, the hypothesised effects might not be correctly captured 
using this simple method. More sophisticated estimation strategies could be developed to gain 
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Abstract	
This paper empirically assesses peer effects of high performing team members in reciprocally 
interdependent team production. Using data from the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
we identify peer effects by exploiting unforeseen in-game injury dropouts of high performing 
players. Results indicate that without a high performing player, other team members maintain 
efficiency but increase risk, decrease output, and divide tasks more evenly among each other. 
These effects mainly depend on whether a high performing player has a team-oriented or a self-
oriented role in the team. Additionally, we observe that relatively skilled players try to step in 
for the absent high performing player. We discuss potential mechanisms for these results. 
 
† A version of this paper has been submitted to Economic Inquiry and is now under revision (April 9 2021). 
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1. Introduction 
In modern economies, many tasks are executed by appointed teams of workers. Thereby, output 
is a function of the combined effort of multiple team members (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Mas 
& Moretti, 2009). Some arbitrary examples include police intervention, R&D, software devel-
opment, surgery, political campaigns, construction, engineering, product development, consult-
ing, and professional sport teams. One salient characteristic of team production is peer effects, 
i.e., genuine effects on worker’s productivity which result from the circumstance of having co-
workers (Ichniowski and Preston 2014). Peer effects are essential for many organizations be-
cause “mechanisms in which individuals influence the productivity of others … directly influ-
ence the performance of organizations” (Oettl 2012, 1138).  
In this context, high performing team members (HPTM) are of particular interest. Besides 
a large individual contribution to team performance, they may disproportionally affect other 
team member’s performance. Peer effects of HPTMs can be positive or negative. Positive peer 
effects occur when team members are either positively motivated by the HPTM’s performance 
or the HPTM directly facilitates task fulfillment. In this regard, Oettl (2012) emphasizes the 
social dimension of “helpfulness” to other team members. In the case of negative peer effects, 
a serious effort by a HPTM can induce other team members to take a free ride or a particularly 
dominant HPTM reduces opportunities of the other team members to perform well. 
The literature on peer effects often proposes behavioral explanations, such as mutual mon-
itoring and peer pressure, social norms, shame, reputation, or guilt (Cornelissen, Dustmann, & 
Schönberg, 2017; Georganas, Tonin, & Vlassopoulos, 2015; Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Mas & 
Moretti, 2009; Simester & Knez, 2000). These concepts strongly rely on the degree of observ-
ability (and measurability) of individual performance by peers or a principal (Ichniowski & 
Preston, 2014; Mas & Moretti, 2009). For instance, if it is difficult to attribute team performance 
to individual team members, motivation loss and social loafing can appear in the presence of a 
HPTM, which corresponds to a negative peer effect (Irwin & Feltz, 2016; Osborn, Irwin, 
Skogsberg, & Feltz, 2012). Apart from behavioral concepts, Gould and Winter (2009) propose 
an approach that fully relies on rational considerations, i.e., income maximization, when only 
overall team performance is observable. A team member’s effort then lowers (increases) the 
effort of peers if they are substitutes (complements) in the production process.  
Although it is widely acknowledged that peer effects matter empirically (Ichniowski & 
Preston, 2014), evidence for the effect direction is mixed. In an extensive systematic review of 
studies on peer effects, Herbst and Mas (2015) report that 60 percent of the reviewed papers 
find significant, mostly positive peer effects, while 40 percent find no evidence. Most of these 
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studies examine how relatively more productive individuals affect their peers’ performance. As 
an exception, Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang (2010), Oettl (2012), and Waldinger (2012) ex-
amine peer effects in coauthoring scientific papers, explicitly focusing on the subgroup of 
HPTMs. Another feature that many of the studies reviewed by Herbst and Mas (2015) have in 
common is no or only little interdependence between peers.1 Similarly, research on peer effects 
in team production predominantly examines settings with little direct interaction among team 
members or with a strictly sequential workflow. A prominent example is the study of Mas and 
Moretti (2009) that finds strong positive productivity effects of relatively more productive su-
permarket cashiers on other cashiers in the same shift when they are within visual sight of each 
other but not in direct interaction.  
To date, much less attention has been paid to peer effects in complex team production 
processes prevailing in many real world workplaces. Complex team production can be charac-
terized by close, constant and often ad-hoc interaction among multiple team members. 
Thompson (1967, 55) calls this situation “reciprocal interdependence”, where “the outputs of 
each become inputs for the others”. In the present empirical study, we want to fill this gap by 
examining peer effects when production is reciprocally interdependent. Our focus is exclusively 
on peer effects of HPTMs.  
We address two prominent difficulties of empirical studies on team production. First, there 
is often a lack of observability and missing or incomplete performance data (Arcidiacono, 
Kinsler, & Price, 2017; Kuehn, 2017; Mas & Moretti, 2009). Second, it is challenging to find a 
setting which allows for causally isolating peer effects. To overcome these caveats, we use 
professional sports as real world laboratory. In professional sports, team production is common 
and diverse, including many reciprocally interdependent activities. Moreover, sports data allow 
precise identification and measurement of individual and team performance. Further, data are 
abundant and individual characteristics are detailed and complete (Arcidiacono et al., 2017; 
Kahn, 2000; Kendall, 2003; Neugart & Richiardi, 2013). Finally, sport environments provide 
the opportunity to exploit quasi-experiments (Kahn, 2000; Neugart & Richiardi, 2013).  
Specifically, we use data from professional basketball, namely, the National Basketball 
Association (NBA). The structures of professional basketball are often considered a suitable 
comparison to many corporations (Chen & Garg, 2018; Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Keidel, 
1985). Production in basketball is reciprocally interdependent and entails complex interactions 
among team members with different skill levels (Chen & Garg, 2018; Ishak & Ballard, 2012). 
 
1 Some examples include packing envelopes (Falk & Ichino, 2006) or solving anagrams and playing computer 
games (Flynn & Amanatullah, 2012). 
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Basketball players take on different roles (e.g., positions on the court) but at the same time are 
required to possess a great deal of generalist skills (Keidel, 1985). Finally, similar to many other 
tasks in modern economies, there is substantial competition and time pressure during a basket-
ball game. 
Previous empirical research on peer effects in sports examined sequential interactions 
among team members, e.g., in athletics relay teams (Depken & Haglund, 2011), in swimming 
relay teams (Neugart & Richiardi, 2013), and in baseball (Gould & Winter, 2009). We are not 
aware of empirical studies on peer effects in reciprocally interdependent production, such as 
basketball. Existing papers that partially relate to peer effects in basketball do not explicitly 
address HPTMs and have different foci. For example, they measure the individual contribution 
of basketball players to overall team success depending on the peers with whom they are play-
ing (Arcidiacono et al., 2017; Kendall, 2003; Kuehn, 2017).  
To answer our research question, we exploit unexpected, sudden injury dropouts of high 
performing players during NBA games. Adaptation to the changed environment of team mem-
bers who are still in action (hereinafter remaining team members) must occur immediately and 
is based on preexisting resources.2 We operationalize team members’ performance with four 
measures: Field Goal Percentage (FG %), a measure for efficiency; expected individual FG %, 
a measure for risk taking; the number of Field Goal Attempts (FGA), a measure for output; and 
the distribution of FGA among team members. Applying a difference-in-difference (DiD) ap-
proach, we show that the injury dropout of a HPTM does not change efficiency, but remaining 
team members take more risk, reduce output, and divide tasks more evenly among themselves. 
The effects are stronger the larger the ‘skill gap’ between the HPTM and the team’s average. 
In addition, the effects are driven by HPTMs with a team-oriented rather than a self-oriented 
role in the team. Eventually, remaining HPTM (other than the HPTM who drops out) react 
differently to the dropout than the average team member. They seem to step in (or take ad-
vantage of the window of opportunity) by increasing output, however, without managing to 
fully compensate. Based on our results, we argue that with constant and reciprocal interaction, 
the facilitating nature of (some) HPTMs potentially is the most important mechanism for the 
observed peer effects.  
We extend previous findings on peer effects from less interdependent and sequential set-
tings by showing empirically that peer effects of HPTMs exist in reciprocally interdependent 
 
2 Some previous studies examine the effect of injury dropouts of important team members in team sports 
(e.g., Chen and Garg 2018; Stuart 2017). However, remaining team members have time to adapt at least un-
til the subsequent game, e.g., by reassessing the organization of human capital or practicing. 
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team production in real world contexts. Our results reveal how team members react immedi-
ately to an unexpected absence of a HPTM, i.e., without having much opportunity to adapt. 
Moreover, our study allows a disaggregated view on peer effects by considering the roles of 
HPTMs and the moderating influence of the relative skill levels in a team. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical set-
ting, the identification strategy, and the data, while section 3 introduces the model and the var-
iables. We present our results in section 4, together with comments on robustness. Section 5 
discusses the results in a broader context and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Empirical setting and data 
We obtain play-by-play data of N=6,423,839 events in 15,707 NBA games, spanning 13 regular 
seasons from 2004/05 to 2016/17, from ESPN, the major US based sports television channel. 
Play-by-play data include a complete sequence of outcome-relevant events during a game, such 
as FGA, Free Throws (FT), rebounds, turnovers, fouls, ejections, substitutions, and timeouts. 
We exclusively focus on FGA taken by a given team during a game (n=1,286,179 FGA). We 
complement play-by-play data with important player characteristics (e.g., performance, posi-
tion, injuries) and team characteristics (e.g., team performance) from https://www.prosp 
ortstransactions.com (injuries), http://insider.espn.com/nba:hollinger/statistics (player statis-
tics), http://stats.nba.com (player and team statistics), and https://www.espn.com (injuries). 
To identify high performing players in the NBA, we use Player Efficiency Rating (PER), 
a common measure of a player’s per-minute productivity that combines a variety of individual 
performance statistics over one season. PER exhibits the highest correlation with salaries 
among various performance measures and, thus, reflects market outcomes (Arcidiacono et al., 
2017). We identify players as high performing if their PER belongs in the top 20 percent per-
centile of the distribution of PER of all NBA players in a given season. Using the top 20 percent 
percentile is justified by the “80-20” rule echoed by practitioners, stating that 80 percent of the 
work in a firm is accomplished by 20 percent of the workers (Chen & Garg, 2018). We include 
only high performing players who play at least half of all games in the given season and on 
average are at least half the total game time on the court during these games. This method avoids 
considering high performing players with small influence on other team members due to little 
presence.  
To isolate the contribution of high performing players on their peers, we exploit unforesee-
able injury dropouts during a game. Injuries create a quasi-experiment “[s]ince injuries are un-
predictable and beyond anyone’s control …” (Chen and Garg 2018, 1250). Injuries usually 
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happen as a result of an unforeseen event and are independent of coaching decisions or individ-
ual performance. We then examine performance of peers of the high performing player before 
and after the injury dropout. The context (the game) thus stays the same, which is important 
since in the heat of the moment, there is only limited opportunity to adapt to the changed situ-
ation. For instance, the roster for that particular game is fixed and no new plays or routines can 
be developed and practiced. Figure 1 visualizes our identification strategy. 
 
 
Figure 1 Identification strategy. 
 
While the “NBA Injury Report” includes players who miss entire games because of an 
injury, there is no data for in-game injuries. To identify relevant games, we follow a multi-stage 
procedure. First, we pick all games with missing high performing players due to an injury. 
Second, we look at the last game before the high performing player appears on the injury report. 
We assume an in-game injury if a high performing player definitively leaves this game before 
the end of the third quarter. In addition, we require that the high performing player’s court time 
during this game is between 40 percent and 75 percent of his season average. The lower bound3 
ensures a certain influence of the player on the other team members, while the upper bound 
considers the early leave due to the injury. Third, we draw a random sample of 100 identified 
games and cross-check with ESPN media reports if there is an injury dropout of the high per-
forming player, which we can confirm in all 100 cases. The resulting sample consists of FGA 
taken by members of teams whose high performing player drops out due to an injury (“injury 
dropout group”).  
We add a control group to cope with other factors that affect performance in the course of 
a game and cannot (completely) be controlled for (e.g., game progression). The control group 
 
3 Forty percent corresponds to the bottom 25 percent percentile of the distribution of the high performing 
player’s relative court time compared to his season average.  
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consists of FGA taken by members of a randomly chosen team whose high performing player 
(according to the criteria described before) does not drop out and is on court at least 90 percent 
of his season average. In the control group, we divide the before and after period using the 
average remaining game time after the injury dropouts in the injury dropout group.  
Defining an injury dropout group and a control group allows the use of a difference-in-
difference (DiD) estimation strategy (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). We compare the change in 
performance before and after the injury dropout between the two groups. 
We exclude n=454,760 FGA in 11,621 games in the following instances: any high per-
forming player drops out due to a different reason than injury (e.g., ejection); more than one 
high performing player drops out due to any reason; at least one high performing player does 
not play (e.g., due to rest, prior injury, or personal reasons); and the high performing player 
who drops out does not fulfill the requirements stated above (e.g., minimal amount of games 
played in a season). 
Last, we restrict the period before and after the dropout to 12 minutes to ensure compara-
bility. We thereby exclude another n=166,702 FGA. In total, our sample consists of n=10,135 





The dependent and independent variables are briefly summarized in Table 1 described below. 
Four performance measures serve as dependent variables.  
The first performance measure is FG %, reflecting the ratio of a player’s successful FGA 
to his total FGA. It is a measure for a player’s shooting efficiency that mainly depends on a 
player’s skills and the zone of the basketball court the FGA is taken from (Figure 2). Because 
we control for how well a player on average scores from a given zone of the court, we do not 
expect an effect of the high performing player’s injury dropout on the efficiency of other play-
ers.  
The second performance measure is expected individual FG %, a measure for risk taking. 
It reflects how promising a player’s shooting position is in terms of a successful FGA. We 
calculate this variable using the career FG % of a player making an attempt from a particular 
zone of the basketball court (Figure 2). We hypothesize that high performing players create 
opportunities for other team members, bringing them into promising positions for FGA and 
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thereby increase their expected individual FG % (which corresponds to lower risk). We expect 
risk to increase after an injury dropout of a high performing player. 
 
 
Figure 2 Shot chart with average Field Goal Percentages (FG %). Based on NBA seasons 2004/2005 to 
2016/2017 and players with at least one whole season in the NBA. The dashed line represents the separation be-
tween three point FGA (outside) and two point FGA (inside). Circles with letters correspond to the usual posi-
tions (for an exemplary lineup): PG=Point Guard; SG=Shooting Guard; SF=Small Forward; PF=Power Forward; 
C=Center. 
 
The third performance measure is the number of FGA normalized to 48 minutes, a measure 
for output. High performing players may speed up the pace of the game, thereby increasing 
output of all team members. Hence, we expect output to decline after an injury dropout of a 
high performing player. 
The fourth performance measure is task allocation, measuring team routines. We use shot 
balance as a proxy for this variable.4 Shot balance measures the distribution of FGA among 
players while taking into account the players’ court times. A higher shot balance indicates a 
more equal distribution of FGA among players. Since high performing players supposedly are 
dominant players, we expect a more equal distribution of FGA after the injury dropout. 
 
4 Shot balance is calculated as follows: 𝑆𝐵 ∑ 𝑠 log 𝑠 ∑ 𝑚 log𝑚⁄  with 𝑠  and 𝑚  representing the pro-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our main independent variable is the injury dropout of a high performing player. We as-
sume heterogeneous effects. First, we expect the effects of the injury dropout to positively de-
pend on the relative skill level of the high performing player, measured by the difference be-
tween the high performing player’s PER and his team’s average. In other words, the larger the 
skill difference, the stronger the effect. Second, we analyze the high performing player’s posi-
tion.5 The difference between guards and forwards is of particular interest: High performing 
guards are the playmakers and usually lead their team in assists. They help others score and are 
characterized as “facilitators” (Arcidiacono et al., 2017). High performing forwards are domi-
nant players who dispose of a relatively high offense effectiveness, but their role is less focused 
on helping others score. In this sense, their way of playing is more self-oriented than in the case 
of guards. Third, we expect the remaining high performing players to react differently to the 
injury dropout than average players because remaining high performing players have the dis-
tinct skills (and presumably high motivation) to compensate for the injured high performing 
player. 
To complete the models, we include a series of control variables for the season and game 
context, characteristics of the high performing player, his team, and the competing team.  
 
3.2 Econometric specification 
The econometric model can be expressed in the usual DiD-notation (Angrist & Pischke, 2008):  
 𝑦 𝛼 𝛽 𝑑 𝛽 𝑇 𝛽 𝑑 ∙ 𝑇 𝛽 𝑋 𝜀  . 
 𝑦  represents the dependent (performance) variable of game 𝑖 in period 𝑡, with 𝑡 ∈ 1, 2  
for the period before and after the injury dropout. 𝑑 is a dummy variable indicating whether 
game i is an injury dropout game or not (injury dropout group vs. control group). 𝑇 is a dummy 
variable which equals 0 for the period before the dropout and 1 for the period after the dropout. 
Hence, the interaction term 𝑑 ∙ 𝑇 represents the variable of interest. It is equal to 1 if and only 
if a high performing player drops out due to an injury. 𝑋  is a vector of control variables. 𝛽 ,𝛽 ,𝛽 ,𝛽  are the coefficient vectors we estimate. We estimate Ordinary Least Squares 
 
5 In basketball, a lineup consists of five players in the following positions (Figure 2): Two guards (point 
guard and shooting guard), two forwards (small forward and power forward), and one center.  
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(OLS) with White heteroskedastic-robust standard errors to avoid inferential bias (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005).6  
In order to estimate heterogeneous effects of the high performing player’s injury dropout, 
we analyze subsamples (for the position of the high performing player and the effect on remain-
ing high performing players). To capture the effect of the relative skill level of the high per-
forming player, we extend the model to a difference-in-difference-in difference (DiDiD) form 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007) by multiplying the interaction term 𝑑 ∙ 𝑇 with the difference of 




4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics. The average FG % is around 0.45. The number of FGA 
per 48 minutes is slightly above 80. The expected individual FG % is naturally very close to 
the average FG % but has a smaller standard deviation. Shot balance averages 0.86. 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
Results for the main DiD regression models and the heterogeneous effects are shown in Table 
3 and Table 4, respectively. 
Efficiency: Given the players’ skills and the zone of the court a FGA is taken from, there 
is no significant effect of the injury dropout on FG % in all estimated models. This result can 
be explained by the ability of the elite NBA players to achieve a stable level of efficiency in a 
wide range of situations. Additionally, FG % in a given situation may not depend on effort and 





6 In DiD-models, the common trend assumption is central for identification (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). We 
argue that absent any injury dropout, the two groups would, on average, have evolved the same way for the 
following reasons: First, the injury dropout of the high performing player is exogenous and therefore the 
selection of injury dropout games is random. Second, we exclude all games which could have evolved dif-
ferently, e.g., due to multiple dropouts of high performing players. Third, we use a series of control variables 
in our models to capture potential differences between groups and periods. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics. 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
FG % 0.457 0.12 0 0.926 
FGA 48 81.87 11.88 40 136 
EXPECTED INDIVIDUAL FG %  45.6 3.314 31.27 59.13 
SHOT BALANCE 0.864 0.068 0.538 1.084 
PROPORTION OF 3S (in %) 22.99 11.14 0.86 86.67 
PERIOD 2 0.5 0.5 0 1 
INJURY DROPOUT GROUP 0.063 0.242 0 1 
INTERACTION TEMR (PERIOD 2 × INJURY DROPOUT GROUP) 0.031 0.174 0 1 
RELATIVE PER DIFFERENCE 1.01 0.097 0.724 1.411 
AVERAGE PER OF TEAM 15.61 1.153 11.1 19.37 
PER OF HIGH PERFORMING PLAYER 19.58 1.81 16.67 30.89 
PER DIFFERENCE OF HIGH PERFORMING PLAYER 3.973 1.992 -1.01 17.91 
CRUNCH TIME ATTEMPTS 0.005 0.142 0 7 
COMPETING TEAM’S BLOCKERS  0.072 0.138 0 1 
DECIDED GAME ATTEMPTS 0.025 0.843 0 36 
SHARE OF FT ON TOTAL ATTEMPTS 0.213 0.109 0 0.613 
CENTER DROPOUT HIGH PERFORMING PLAYER 0.233 0.423 0 1 
FORWARD DROPOUT HIGH PERFORMING PLAYER 0.447 0.497 0 1 
GUARD DROPOUT HIGH PERFORMING PLAYER 0.319 0.466 0 1 
SHARE OF CLOSE GAME ATTEMPTS 0.46 0.365 0 1 
INITIAL SCORE 0.023 8.086 -32 36 
HOME GAME DUMMY 0.502 0.5 0 1 
ROUND 38.35 22.64 1 82 
Based on n=166,702 FGA in 4,088 games. 
 
Risk taking: The expected individual FG %, i.e., the ex-ante likelihood of a FGA taken by 
a given player from a particular zone of the court being successful, significantly decreases after 
the dropout. This means that players increasingly take FGA from zones where their expected 
FG % is relatively smaller. We propose three explanations for an underlying mechanism. First, 
players might exert less effort to get into such positions. Second, they try to compensate for the 
injury dropout of the high performing player by increasing risk through shifting to more three 
point FGA that, on average, are riskier than two point FGA (Figure 2). However, we do not 
find a significant increase in the proportion of three point FGA on total FGA after the injury 
dropout (Table A 2 in the Appendix). Third, remaining players are unable to get into promising 
positions for FGA, because the valuable input by the injured high performing player is missing. 
This last possibility finds justification in the observation that the decrease in expected individual 
FG % is driven by the dropout of high performing guards, who are facilitators. The risk increase 
after the dropout positively depends on the PER difference between the high performing guard 
and his team’s average. In contrast, we do not observe any significant effect on risk taking of 
remaining high performing players (although the coefficient is basically the same as in the main 
model). They seem to be able and willing to maintain expected FG %. 
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Table 3 Regression results of DiD models. 




























































































AVERAGE ZONE FG % 0.422*** 
(0.046) 
   






































N 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 
Adj. R2 0.043 0.077 0.043 0.043 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
Output: We find a significant negative effect of the high performing player’s dropout on 
output. This effect is driven by the dropout of high performing guards. Again, this is consistent 
with the facilitating nature of high performing guards, i.e., their team-oriented role (e.g., by 
passing the ball quickly to players in a promising shooting position). In addition, we observe 
that the bigger the difference of the high performing player’s PER to the team’s average, the 
stronger the negative effect on output. Interestingly, remaining high performing players in-
crease their output. They seem to try to step in after the dropout. Since the effect in the main 
model is significantly negative, however, they do not manage to fully compensate.  
Task allocation: We find shot balance is significantly higher after the injury dropout, which 
means that FGA are more evenly distributed among remaining players. This result indicates 
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that, on average, no other team member fully takes over the dominant role of the injured high 
performing player. The effect, however, is significant only if the injured high performing player 
is a forward, whose rather self-oriented way of playing seems to skew task allocation. Some-
what surprisingly, the balancing effect of the injury dropout on task allocation is negatively 
related to the difference between the high performing player’s PER and his team’s average. One 
potential explanation is that we observe the highest average, median, and maximum PER dif-
ferences for high performing guards, who do not skew task allocation.  
 
Table 4 Heterogeneous effects – interaction terms only. 
Submodels FG % FGA 48 Expected  
FG %  
Shot  
balance 



































































Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
4.3 Robustness analysis 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we run a series of additional tests. First, our 
results are robust against different approaches of correcting standard errors to avoid inferential 
bias, such as clustering or bootstrapping. Second, our results do not change if we apply various 
specifications of fixed effects for the high performing player’s team and the competing team in 
a given season. Third, we narrow the high performing players to the top 15 percent of the PER 
distribution, without changing our results.7 Fourth, our findings are robust against many differ-
ent specifications and definitions of control variables. In fact, we can reproduce very similar 
results using a simple DiD specification without control variables (Table A 1 in the Appendix). 
Accordingly, results do not change if we remove all variables that are potentially prone to mul-
ticollinearity in terms of high variance inflation factors or to endogeneity. Fifth, we find no 
 
7 Compared to the main models, coefficients in the models for output and risk taking slightly increase, while 
the coefficient in the model for task allocation is slightly smaller. This is consistent with the result that the 
effects positively depend on the difference between the high performing player’s PER and the team’s average. 
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differences in our estimates when we exclude observations in late season games, where incen-
tives for teams to win may be different with regard to post season (play-off) pairings or a fa-
vorable draft position (Ishak & Ballard, 2012; Walters & Williams, 2012). Finally, our results 
do not change if we try different requirements regarding the definition of a high performing 
player in terms of games played and average minutes per game. Overall, our results are robust 
against various alternative specifications and definitions. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Teamwork with complex interaction patterns and skill heterogeneity is prevalent in many in-
dustries. Thereby, HPTMs make large individual contributions to team performance. In addi-
tion, they can influence performance of other team members through peer effects. Using data 
from professional basketball, we show that after an unexpected, sudden dropout of a HPTM, 
remaining team members increase risk, reduce output, and divide tasks more evenly among 
themselves. We observe heterogeneity in these effects: First, a higher relative skill level of the 
HPTM compared to the team’s average amplifies the decrease in output and the increase in risk 
taking but attenuates the balancing effect on task allocation. Second, the effects on risk taking 
and output are driven by HPTMs in integrative, team-oriented roles. Task allocation becomes 
more even only when the absent HPTM’s role is more self-oriented. Third, remaining high 
performing team members react differently to the sudden absence of their HPTM. They increase 
their output and otherwise maintain a stable performance.  
These results extend previous findings on peer effects in several ways. First, we study re-
ciprocally interdependent production in a real world context, which so far has received little 
attention in research on peer effects in teams. In this way, we add to the manifold results on 
peer effects in less interdependent or sequential team production. Next, we explicitly focus on 
peer effects of the subgroup of HPTMs as an important element of a team. Further, the use of 
multiple performance measures as well as the inclusion of heterogeneity of skills and roles 
allows us a differentiated and detailed view on peer effects. For instance, we extend Oettl's 
(2012) concept of helpfulness as a social dimension to reciprocally interdependent team pro-
duction by showing that the observed peer effects are driven by facilitating HPTMs with an 
integrative role in the team. High individual productivity does not necessarily mean large pos-
itive peer effects and therefore, not all HPTMs contribute disproportionally to team perfor-
mance (Berri & Krautmann, 2006). Eventually, our analysis of the immediate reaction to the 
unexpected, sudden absence of a HPTM clearly differs from other studies examining effects of 
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absenteeism of important team members (e.g., Chen and Garg 2018; Stuart 2017) where teams 
have time to adapt and prepare, e.g., by practicing.  
Our estimates do not allow us to explicitly disentangle the underlying mechanisms for the 
observed peer effects. What possibly limits the scope for behavioral explanations is that indi-
vidual performance in professional basketball is constantly observed by peers, the management, 
and spectators. Social pressure is constantly high, presumably preventing social loafing (Osborn 
et al., 2012). Nonetheless, especially non-high performing team members may decrease their 
effort while blaming the absence of the HPTM for an inferior individual performance. Reduced 
effort could explain the result of lower output and higher risk because compensating for the 
injured HPTM requires additional (costly) effort. A more likely line of reasoning, however, 
relies on the facilitating nature of (some) HPTMs. Our results clearly point in that direction 
because the observed peer effects are mainly driven by HPTMs with a rather team-oriented 
role. Constant and reciprocal interaction with such team members is a direct channel for peer 
effects through facilitation. Non-high performing team members profit when the HPTM creates 
promising opportunities for them (where their marginal product is relatively higher). In other 
words, there is a complementary relationship between HPTMs and their non-high performing 
peers in that performance of one team member depends on the inputs of (high performing) peers 
(Oettl, 2012). In contrast, the subgroup of all HPTMs in a team, besides being complements as 
well, face a certain level of within-team competition among each other. Highly talented team 
members strive for recognition, promotion, and better contracts. They may recognize the sud-
den absence of a HPTM as a window of opportunity to step out of the HPTM’s shadow. Their 
marginal products increase and they can signal their high value to the team (Gould & Winter, 
2009).  
To gain further insights into potential mechanisms for peer effects of HPTMs in recipro-
cally interdependent team production, future research could focus on effort levels and routines. 
In the present empirical setting, this would include measurement of distance covered, running 
speed, or pass patterns by using tracking data. A second promising research question in this 
context includes the value of HPTMs in special circumstances, such as situations of particularly 
high pressure or critical phases during a team task. 
Our study has certain limitations. There are some important control variables we cannot 
consider because adequate data was not available. We are not able to fully control for tactical 
responses of coaches during a given game or strategic behavior in different situations (e.g., 
giving certain important players a rest with regard to an important subsequent game). Also, we 
only have limited possibilities to control for the (change in) defense behavior of the competing 
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team. The basketball setting has certain peculiarities, potentially limiting generalizations of our 
results to other organizations. For instance, NBA teams consist of the world’s best players with 
well above average salaries. In addition, basketball provides fast paced and turbulent environ-
ments with a high level of observability in terms of performance. Previous research, however, 
acknowledges the transferability of results from sports (and explicitly basketball) to other in-
dustries (Chen & Garg, 2018; Day et al., 2012; Keidel, 1985). Thereby, it is clear that our results 
mainly apply to contexts with similar characterizing levers, such as reciprocal interdependence, 
a constant structural working environment, measurability of performance, and different roles 
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Appendix to section 4 (Results) 
 
Table A 1 Regression results of simple DiD models (without controls). 
 FG % FGA 48 Expected 
FG %  
Shot  
balance 
































N 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 
Adj. R2 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.017 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
Table A 2 Regression results of DiD model for the proportion of 3s as dependent variable. 
 Proportion  
of 3s (in %) 
 
 
PERIOD 2 0.389 
(0.258) 
 
INJURY DROPOUT GROUP 0.58 
(0.763) 
 
PERIOD 2 × INJURY DROPOUT GROUP 1.665 
(1.092) 
 
AVERAGE PER 0.55*** 
(0.105) 
 
REL. PER DIFFERENCE TEAMS -1.732 
(1.273) 
 
COMPETING TEAM’S DEFENSE 0.249*** 
(0.016) 
 
COMPETING TEAM’S BLOCKERS -0.018* 
(0.001) 
 
CRUNCH TIME ATTEMPTS -0.326 
(0.684) 
 
CLOSE GAME ATTEMPTS -1.371*** 
(0.337) 
 
DECIDED GAME 0.089 
(0.201) 
 
SHARE OF FT ON TOTAL ATTEMPTS -2.845** 
(1.154) 
 
FGA PER 48 MIN -0.051** 
(0.011) 
 
INITIAL SCORE 0.013 
(0.016) 
 









N 8,176  
Adj. R2 0.036  
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